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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a woman wants to bring a claim for sexual
harassment against her powerful and wealthy former employer
but can neither afford counsel nor find an attorney willing to
take the case on contingency. A private funder provides the
necessary financing for her to pursue her claim. Further suppose that the employer in question is a former governor, now
the sitting President of the United States, and that the investor
is a wealthy supporter of the President's political opposition,
and that the case starts a chain reaction that could have
brought an end to the President's term in office.1

1. This is, of course, the Paula Jones case against Bill Clinton. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.
1996). On the funding and possible instigation of the claim by a right-wing businessman, see Jay Branegan, Paula Jones: Case Dismissed, TIME.COM (Apr. 1,
1998), http://www.time.com/time/community/transcripts/chattr04Ol98.html. I
thank Henry Hansmann for bringing this example to my attention.
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Now imagine a group of indigent villagers in Angola, whose
village has been subject to a negligent and lethal chemical spill
at the hands of the agents of a multinational corporation based
in the United States. The cover-up involves spying on, intimidating, and even murdering locals. Unable to afford a suit on
their own, an investment company funds their attempt to seek
redress through an expensive, protracted, and complex Alien
Tort Claims Act 2 claim filed in a U.S. court.
Imagine also a corporation that is facing a bet-the-company
class action lawsuit, which it is convinced is a strike-suit (i.e., a
nonmeritorious but prohibitively expensive suit to defend). 3
Facing the risk of an uncertain jury verdict, it transfers that
risk to a third party by paying a premium. Thus protected, it
enables itself to continue its smooth operation generating profits for its shareholders and jobs for its employees.
Contemplate, if you will, an oil company funding a developing country's claim in a boundary dispute. The dispute over territory rich with petroleum is being decided in an international
arbitration-a confidential and, therefore, nontransparent
process to which even the citizens of the countries whose
boundaries are in dispute have no access. Further envision that
the developing country has no funds of its own and would otherwise be unable to mount a competent defense of its claim to
the territory.
Finally, suppose that the China Investment Corporation
(CIC), China's Sovereign Wealth Fund, funds a suit against an
American company in a sensitive industry such as military
technology. In the process of conducting due diligence prior to
its investment in the litigation, as well as in connection with its
ongoing monitoring of the litigation in which it now has a legal
stake, CIC obtains highly confidential documents containing
proprietary information regarding sensitive technologies from
the American defendant-corporation.
What do all of these scenarios-some uplifting, some foreboding-have in common? The answer is that they would all be
made possible by a group of practices that are coming to be
known as third-party litigation funding. Litigation funding,
still in its infancy but steadily growing, is one of the most sig-

2. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3. See Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J.
CORP. L. 361, 367 (2008).
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nificant developments in civil litigation today. 4 It represents a
potential sea change in the character and policy implications of
litigation in the United States. Litigation funding affects
numerous areas of the law including corporate law (securities,
antitrust, and all manner of corporate defense), intellectual
property, tort law, environmental law, employment law, human
rights law, and international law. Taking into account the industry's ascendance overseas and its foothold in the United
States, it behooves us to examine the effects third-party litigation funding will have on the American legal system.
Litigation finance in the United States is in its infancy,
however. On the one hand, economic forces are propelling its
expansion, while, on the other, prohibitive regulation bars its
usage in most states. The economic forces, discussed in more
detail below, include competitive pressures on U.S.-based international law firms by non-U.S.-based international law
firms that can avail themselves of such funding, the effects of
the recent global recession, and the convergence of a number of
long-standing trends relating to law-firm finance. The outdated
ethics regulation, predominantly in the form of the doctrine of
champerty-the prohibition on dividing litigation proceeds between a party and a non-party who supports the legal actionand the prohibition on fee splitting with nonlawyers, casts serious doubt on the legality of the practice in most, if not all,
states. 5
As the examples above illustrate and this Article will explain, the effect will differ depending on a combination of who
is doing the funding, who is receiving the funding, and the subject matter of the dispute involved. The examples are also evocative of the fact, identified and analyzed in this Article, that litigation funding may do more than just the obvious (i.e.,
facilitate access to justice). By aligning structurally weak social
players who make infrequent use of the courts (one-shotters)
with powerful funders who make repeated use of the court system (repeat players), litigation funding may alter the bargaining dynamics between the litigating parties in favor of disempowered parties. It may thereby enable the litigation process to
4. See Third Party Litigation Funding and Claim Transfer, RAND
CORP., http://www.rand.org/events/2009/06/02.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011)
(identifying third-party litigation funding as one of the "biggest and most influential trends in civil justice").
5. See infra Part II (discussing the state of the law of champerty and fee
splitting).
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serve as a redistributive tool by society's have-nots as opposed
to an (unwitting, perhaps) guardian of the status quo in favor
of society's haves. 6 In other words, it may allow these traditionally disempowered parties to "play for rules," i.e., to affect the
content of legal rules determined by the courts. This Article
will further argue that these beneficial effects could be offset by
two factors: (1) the development of secondary markets in legal
claims, and (2) the fragmentation of the attorney-client-funder
relationship under the rules of professional responsibility into
two separate relationships between attorney and client and between client and funder. Both factors offset the potential beneficial effects by creating agency problems. Those offsetting factors, however, can be managed by a sufficiently nuanced
regulatory scheme, the outline of which this Article will proffer.
While a handful of scholars have written about litigation
lending, a precursor of litigation finance, 7 this Article describes
6. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974). For a
more detailed discussion, see infra notes 120-29. Following Galanter, the term
"redistributive" is used herein to mean systemically equalizing a party's ability to affect rule change via litigation. See Galanter, supra,at 95. "Rule change"
means a change of a rule of law via judicial determination. Id. at 135. For example, a judicial determination that a certain tort requires reasonable care,
not strict liability, or that the burden of proof for a certain defense lies with one
party, not another, constitutes rule change. Parties that are able to play for
rules have enhanced ability to strengthen their long-term interests.
7. A few scholars have written about what is referred to herein as "firstwave litigation funding" by litigation lenders (as distinguished from "secondwave litigation funding" by institutional investors discussed infra Part IA).
See, e.g., Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the
Post-Rancman Era, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 798 (2004); Susan Lorde
Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 85, 95-101 (2002); Susan Lorde Martin, FinancingPlaintiffs'
Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 57, 79-83 (1999); Susan Lorde Martin, LitigationFinancing:Another
Subprime Industry that Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L.
REV. 83, 86-87 (2008) [hereinafter Martin, LitigationFinancing];Susan Lorde
Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should
Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 68 (2004) [hereinafter Martin, The Wild West]; Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding:
Chartinga Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 618-34 (2007); Mariel Rodak, Comment, It's About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation FinanceIndustry and Its Effects on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503,
510-14 (2006). Jonathan Molot has also written on the need to develop a market in corporate defense claims. Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation
Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009). John Coffee has a subsection on litigation
finance in his article about aggregate litigation in Europe. John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
288, 339-43 (2010) (discussing how third-party funding can fit in a "non-
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the empirical reality of institutional investing in litigation in
the United States, identifies and addresses the prospect of securitization of legal claims, and discusses third-party funding
of international arbitration. It also applies a bargaining analysis to the debate on the desirability of any type of litigation
finance or lending.
Part I of this Article will provide the background necessary
to place the new industry in context, including a description of
the first and second waves of litigation funding, current market
forces driving the development of the latter industry, the accelerating effects of the global recession that began in 2007, and a
discussion of litigation funding in the foreign jurisdictions that
permit it-predominantly, Australia and the United Kingdom.
Part II will explore the doctrinal landscape that controls
and limits litigation funding in the United States. Together, the
law of champerty and the prohibition on attorneys sharing fees
with non-attorneys comprise a prohibition on litigation funding.
A particular emphasis will be given to the policy rationales underlying these prohibitions. In addition, and by way of contrast
to the prohibition on litigation funding, this Part will explore
some areas of law in which claim transfer and litigation funding are allowed, albeit with certain conditions and limitations.
These are, first and foremost, the areas of contingency fees and
insurance law, but also, secondarily, areas such as qui tam
laws, the law of assignment, and bankruptcy. Part II will conclude by showing that the blanket prohibition of champerty and
entrepreneurial model" of aggregate litigation (class action) in Europe). Forthcoming discussions on litigation finance include Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract id=1593329, and Stephen C. Yeazell, Transparencyfor Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits?, in TRANSPARENCY IN THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (Joseph Doherty & Robert Reville eds., forthcoming 2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=1161343 (advocating for greater transparency
regarding settlements of civil claims). Yeazell, a historian and theorist of civil
litigation, has previously argued that the most important phenomena of modern litigation are best understood as results of changes in the financing and
capitalization of the bar. Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-FinancingCivil Litigation, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 183 (2001). There is also some literature in Australia
and the United Kingdom discussing litigation finance as it occurs in those jurisdictions. See, e.g., VICKI WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS: LAW, POLICY &
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA, UK & US (2008); Lee Aitken, Before the

High Court: 'Litigation Lending' After Fostif, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 171 (2006);
John Peysner, A Revolution by Degrees: From Costs to Financingand the End
of the Indemnity Principle, 1 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2001), http://

webjci.ncl.ac.uk/2001/issuel/rtf/peysnerl.rtf. However, the applicability of the
Australian and English experience and especially the policy considerations for
and against litigation finance is limited. See infra note 23.
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fee splitting contributes to the very type of systemic inequities
it was intended to avoid.
Next, this Article will show how litigation funding can reduce those systemic inequities, though not without attendant
dangers. To set the stage, Part III will open with a taxonomy of
the dimensions of litigation relevant to the consideration of the
effects of third-party funding-the types of clients, claims, and
funders. Using a bargaining perspective,8 the remainder of Part
III will then argue that litigation funding can (1) level the playing field by strengthening the bargaining position of have-nots
and increasing their ability to play for rule change while limiting (to an extent) the ability of the haves to do so, and (2) create
agency problems that vary greatly depending on the clientclaim-funder combination in play. Therefore, any attempt to
capture the equalizing benefits of third-party financing of litigation must rest on a nuanced regulatory scheme sensitive to
the distinct requirements of different taxonomical combinations.
Part IV will then provide a five-pronged regulatory framework, with concrete examples, that harnesses the positive potential of litigation funding while addressing the problems it
might create if left unchecked. The five prongs are (1) eliminate
the champerty prohibition, at least as it relates to litigation
funding; (2) reform the attorney-client-funder relationship, including by extending some of the protections and duties of the
attorney-client relationship to the funder-client relationship,
8. This Article draws in particular on Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950 (1979), particularly their notion of "private ordering"-the effects of
legal rules on bargaining outside the courts. In our case, the legal rules in
question are the ethical prohibition on litigation finance. See COLIN F.
CAMERER,

BEHAVIORAL

GAME

THEORY:

EXPERIMENTS

IN

STRATEGIC

INTERACTION (2003); Martin J. Bailey & Paul H. Rubin, A Positive Theory of
Legal Change, 14 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 467 (1994) [hereinafter Bailey & Rubin, Legal Change]; Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey,
The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994) [hereinafter Rubin & Bailey, The Role of Lawyers]; Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the
Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) [hereinafter Rubin, Why
Is the Common Law Efficient; Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence
Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) [hereinafter Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence];
Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of
Suit and of Settlement, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 99 (1999); Paul H. Rubin,
Why Was the Common Law Efficient? (Emory Sch. of Law & Econ. Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 04-06), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=498645.
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limiting the prohibition on fee sharing to allow attorneys to
contract directly with the funders, and allowing and encouraging fee structures that align the three parties' interests; (3) apply consumer-protection and contract-design principles to funding agreements; (4) require court supervision over the attorneyclient-funder relationship; and (5) tailor securities regulation to
legal-claims-backed securities.
This Article is aimed at two main audiences. One consists
of legislators, regulators, and courts, all of whom will, no doubt,
be called on in the coming years to decide on the legality and
parameters of the practices comprising third-party litigation
funding. The second consists of parties who are contemplating
entering such funding agreements and the attorneys who
represent them. This audience will benefit from the elucidation
of the issues they should consider when drafting such agreements.
I. THE RISE OF LITIGATION FINANCE9
This Part defines the term "third-party litigation funding,"
as used herein, and provides the key characteristics of the industry to which it refers. It distinguishes litigation finance
from similar and overlapping practices, such as litigation lending, by identifying its distinctive features. This includes the key
feature that distinguishes it from analogous practices such as
contingency fees-the industry's ability and tendency to develop secondary markets in legal claims. This Part also explains
the origins of the industry in the United Kingdom and Australia, touching on key legal developments that rendered the practice permissible, with certain restrictions, in those jurisdictions.
It then describes how those changes overseas, coupled with the
ongoing recession, are creating market forces that drive the
penetration of litigation funding into the United States. All
these set the stage for the normative discussion of the desirable
legal regime for litigation funding in subsequent Parts.
A. LITIGATION FINANCE DEFINED

Third-party litigation funding is "a group of funding methods that rely on funds from the insurance markets or capital

9. This Part is informed by twelve not-for-attribution background interviews with executives of litigation-funding firms and attorneys who have utilized litigation finance.
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markets instead of, or in addition to, a litigant's own funds."10
In other words, it is the provision of funds by companies who
have no other connection with the litigation." When provided
to plaintiffs, third-party funding promotes access to justice by
enabling plaintiffs who have meritorious cases to bring litigation they would otherwise be unable to bring and to avoid premature settlements at a discount due to the exhaustion of
funds. 12 When provided to defendants, it allows corporations
who can afford to litigate but who do not want to incur any of
the costs or risks associated with litigation to shift the costs
and hedge the risks. 13
The typical funding arrangement has been described by
one of the major international law firms as one whereby
a specialist funding company or a hedge fund ... pay[s] the lawyers'
fees on an interim basis.... If you win, you pay a contingency fee out
of the damages, usually expressed as a percentage of the damages up
to an agreed cap. A typical contingency fee would be between twenty
and fifty percent of the damages, with a cap of three to four times the
14
legal costs advanced by the funder.

Importantly, the client contracts directly with the funder in
these agreements.15 However, informal agreements between
the funder and the attorney are at times involved. 16 Also critical to the viability of the industry's business model in the United States is that funders leverage their emerging relationships
with law firms to negotiate reduced contingencies, reduced
hourly rates, flat fees, or some combination of the aforesaid.17
Given that these funders thus far are run by former lawyers
who are familiar with but disconnected from the inefficiencies
of the law firm, they provide monitoring services. As expe-

10. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, DEMAND FOR THIRD PARTY LITIGATION
FUNDING RISES AS SUPPLY BECOMES VOLATILE (2008), available at http://
www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/427586D3-6891-4FC2-B926-B0181DB75595/0/
third-party_1itigation-funding-ca-oct08.pdf.
11. See Martin, The Wild West, supra note 7, at 55-57.
12. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, supra note 10.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. See Jonathan Wheeler & Felicity Potter, Welcome to the Party, 158
NEW L.J. 1491, 1491 (2008) ("The funder is also likely to demand, as much as
anything as a sign of faith in the merits of the case on the part of the claimant's lawyers, that the claimant's solicitors enter into a discounted conditional
fee agreement whereby the solicitors charge perhaps 70% of their usual costs
but are entitled to an uplift in the event of success.").
17. See Martin, LitigationFinancing,supra note 7, at 90.
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rienced former attorneys, they may also have an edge in case
selection.
The new industry, referred to herein as "second-wave litigation funding," is populated by institutional investors including some very prominent and sophisticated firms such as the
leading Swiss bank, Credit Suisse, and the German insurance
giant, Allianz. 18 It was preceded, however, by approximately a
decade in which smaller, less reputable firms launched litigation-lending businesses, a practice referred to herein as "firstwave litigation funding." These were often relatively small operations set up by former contingency fee lawyers who recognized the demand for such lending services and oftentimes engaged in predatory lending. As such, first-wave litigation
funding has been regarded by some as a form of subprime lending. 19
Whereas it was traditionally individual plaintiffs who resorted to third-party funding, often in personal injury cases,
the recent trend is aimed at very different markets: corporate
litigants, including corporate defendants, classes (in class action cases), and individual plaintiffs in non-personal injury cases. There is a particular push for litigation funding in international arbitration where, at times, the funded party may be a
sovereign entity. 20 In international arbitrations, the reason for
18. See Michael Herman, Fear of Third Party Litigation Funding Is
Groundless, TIMES ONLINE (Oct. 25, 2007), http://business.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/business/law/article2738493.ece; Litigation Funding Starting to Pay Off,
SEC. DOCKET (May 5, 2009, 7:02AM), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2009/
05/05/litigation-funding-starting-to-pay-off/.
19. See Martin, The Wild West, supra note 7, at 88 (discussing the Rancman case in which the plaintiff received litigation financing with interest rates
of 280 percent); Rodak, supra note 7, at 514. Second-wave litigation finance
firms are also set up by lawyers. See, e.g., Press Release, Burford Capital, Burford Capital Announces Initial Investment Successes and Further Investments
(July 28, 2010), available at http://www.burfordcapital.com/pdfs/Burford%
20Capital%2OJuly%202010%20press%20release.pdfrID=362318.
20. See Telis Demos, Cashing in on Litigation, FORTUNE, May 11, 2009, at
20, 20 ("Juridica gives money to Fortune 500-size companies or their lawyers
in the early stages of corporate lawsuits in exchange for a share of the payout
if the plaintiffs win or settle."); Herman, supra note 18 ("A closer look at the
litigation funds operating in the London market ... reveals that they are seeking to invest in commercial rather than personal disputes."); Gillian Lemaire,
Costs in InternationalCommercial Arbitration:The Case for Predictability,COM.
DIsP. RESOL., Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.cdr-news.com/expert-views/101-costs-in
-international-commercial-arbitration-the-case-for-predictability ("Specialist litigation funds, frequently institutional investors, have become more common in
certain countries and although investment is made more frequently in litigation, it is now becoming increasingly common in international arbitration cas-
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this expansion is partly a de facto absence of professional regulations that enables funders and attorneys to operate outside of
the disciplinary reach of bar associations. On the defense side,
there is a market gap as contingency fee arrangements are inapplicable to defendants who need to transfer not only the cost
of legal fees and litigation expenses, as do plaintiffs, but also of
judgments and settlements. 2 1 So, while attorney funding and
third-party funding of individual and class claims are not unprecedented, funding of corporate defendants and international
arbitrations is a new phenomenon.
B. GLOBAL ECONOMIC MARKET FORCES PROPELLING THE RISE
OF LITIGATION FINANCE

1. Competitive Pressures from Litigation Funding in Foreign
Jurisdictions
The pressures driving the emergence of a new market in
legal claims and defenses in the United States, despite a hostile
regulatory environment, can only be understood in a global context. A few foreign jurisdictions, predominantly Australia and
the United Kingdom, have taken progressive strides in the past
fifteen years to loosen or abolish long-standing champerty restrictions and to develop markets for third-party funding. 22
There is also the beginning of a discourse on allowing the same
in Europe. 23
es. Indeed, some third party funders are now believed to target international
arbitrations for investment."); Claire Ruckin, U.K. Third-Party Litigation
Funding Rules in Final Stages, LAw.COM (July 31, 2008), http://www
.1aw.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202423414109 ("Although this funding method has
been traditionally popular on the claimant's side, a handful of major companies
are now trying to defend high-stakes litigation with third-party funding.").
21. On the lack of de facto regulation of lawyers engaged in cross-border
litigation, see Maya Steinitz, Internationalized Pro Bono and a New Global
Role for Lawyers in the 21st Century: Lessons from Nation-Building in Southern Sudan, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 205, 211-15 (2009). On the market
gap in litigation-defense finance, see Molot, supra note 7, at 377.
22. See Aitken, supra note 7, at 177.
23. The developments in the United Kingdom and in Australia must be
viewed in light of the fact that both jurisdictions are governed by the so-called
British rule which requires the losing party to pay the winner's attorneys' fees.
Conversely, the American rule requires that each party bear its own fees. This
means access to justice is more limited in British rule jurisdictions as the rule
leads to less litigation, including less meritorious litigation. See John F. Vargo,
The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to
Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1635-36 (1993). Also, in both Australia and
the United Kingdom the legal availability of contingency fees (fees in which
the attorney gets a share of the judgment) is much more limited, and takes the

HeinOnline -- 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1278 2010-2011

2011]

THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING

1279

In Australia, where third-party litigation funding was initially permitted in the bankruptcy context and later gained acceptance in civil litigation generally, litigation funding has
been a feature of litigation for more than a decade. Australian
courts, like courts in the rest of the common-law world, have
historically prohibited litigation funding. 24 But "[t]he Australian courts have demonstrated in their decisions and in obiter
commentary that public policy is changing, and that it is no
longer taboo for a party who provides funding for a case, to
have a legitimate commercial interest in the outcome." 25 Similarly, Australian legislatures have begun to adopt a liberal
stance on litigation funding by relaxing champerty restrictions
through legislative action. 26
In joint landmark cases on this issue, Campbells Cash and
Carry Pty. Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd.27 and Mobil Oil Australia Pty.
Ltd. v Trendlen Pty. Ltd.,28 the Australian High Court permitted third-party funding with the funder having broad powers to
control the litigation. Fostif involved a litigation funder who
sought to fund a litigation allowing small tobacco retailers to
recover license fees from wholesalers. 29 The third-party funder
actively searched for and propositioned potential plaintiffs in
the case.s0 Importantly, the funding agreement permitted the
funder to conduct representative proceedings, choose the attorney (who regarded the funder as its client), and settle with the
form of a conditional fee (fees in which the lawyer gets a premium if the case is
won, which is unrelated to the adjudicated amount), further restricting access
to justice as compared with the United States. See Winand Emons & Nuno

Garoupa, U.S.-Style Contingent Fees and U.K.-Style ConditionalFees: Agency
Problems and the Supply of Legal Services, 27 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
379, 379-80 (2006). On the European discourse generally, see CHRISTOPHER
HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN
LEGAL SYSTEMS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE
(2008), and Coffee, supra note 7, at 340-42, which suggests a "nonentrepreneurial model" of aggregate litigation for Europe where the American
entrepreneurial model, including the contingent fee and the American rule regarding costs, has long been resisted.
24. See Aitken, supra note 7, at 172-74.
25. CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, THE FUTURE FUNDING OF LITIGATIONALTERNATIVE FUNDING STRUCTURES 54 (2007), available at http://www
.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/future fundinglitigationpaper v117 final.pdf.
26. See Aitken, supra note 7, at 174.
27. (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.) (considering recovery for tobacco license
fees).
28. (2006) 229 ALR 51 (Austl.) (considering recovery for petroleum license
fees).
29. Fostif,229 CLR at 413.

30. See id.
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defendants for seventy-five percent of the amount claimed. 31
Per the agreement, the funder paid all associated costs and was
to receive thirty-three percent of any recovered amount as well
as cost awards. 32
Recognizing the various concerns in question, the court
stressed, on the one hand, the value provided by access to funding and the funder's need to have some measure of control over
the litigation while, on the other, stating that court supervision, ethics rules, and rules governing representative proceedings mitigated the traditional dangers posed by third-party
funding. 33 The court, in a nod to freedom-of-contract concerns,
also noted that it was hesitant to interfere with funding agreements when entered into by persons of "full age and capacity
... untainted by infirmity." 34 The Fostif case provided much
needed certainty to the status of litigation funding in Australia.
Moreover, as recently as October 2009, the Australian High
Court has interpreted its decision in Fostif to be a ban on any
general rule prohibiting the funding of litigation for reward. 35
Following closely in the footsteps of Australia is England.
It too took legislative steps to amend champerty laws. The
Criminal Law Act of 1967 abolished criminal and civil liability
for champerty, but the legislation did not "affect any rule of law
as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary
to public policy or otherwise illegal." 36 English courts embraced
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 435-36 ("The solution to [the] problem [of the high cost of litigation] (if there is one) does not lie in treating actions financially supported by
third parties differently from other actions. And if there is a particular aspect
of the problem that is to be observed principally in actions where a plaintiff
represents others, that is a problem to be solved, in the first instance, through
the procedures that are employed in that kind of action. It is not to be solved by
identifying some general rule of public policy that a defendant may invoke to
prevent determination of the claims that are made against that defendant."
(emphasis added)).
34. Id. at 434-35.
35. See Jeffery & Katauskas Pty. Ltd. v SST Consulting Pty. Ltd. (2009)
239 CLR 75, 92 (Austl.) (addressing the issue of indemnity for costs by litigation funders).
36. Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 14 (Eng.). Despite Australia's progressive attitude toward litigation funding, it must be noted that a recent, and
controversial, Federal Court ruling has led to considerable confusion regarding
the legality of this practice. On October 20, 2009, the Federal Court ruled that
litigation funding was regulated by the Corporations Act of 2001. Brookfield
Multiplex Ltd. v Int'l Litig. Funding PartnersPte. Ltd. (2009) 180 FCR 11, 33,
37-38 (Austl.). Pursuant to the Act, private litigation funders would be required to hold an Australian Financial Services license before offering funding
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the legislative changes to champerty law in a progressive manner, and readily admitted that champerty law must evolve over
time to reflect changing views of public policy. 37 The qualified
limitation of champerty restrictions permitted English courts to
act with a great deal of discretion, but it left observers and potential funders of litigation with some uncertainty.
The most dramatic legal development for the litigationfunding industry came in 2005 in the form of a decision by the
English Court of Appeal in Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd.3S In
that case, the Court of Appeal held that, while third-party
funding is acceptable and even desirable as a way of increasing
access to justice, the funder does not control the management of
the litigation:
The approach that we are about to commend will not be appropriate
in the case of a funding agreement that falls foul of the policy considerations that render an agreement champertous.... Our approach is
designed to cater for the commercial funder who is financing part of
the costs of the litigation in a manner which facilitates access to justice and which is not otherwise objectionable. Such funding will leave
the claimant as the party primarily interested in the result of the litigation and the party in control of the conduct of the litigation.39

Consequently, international law firms based in the United
Kingdom began utilizing litigation funding or seriously considering doing so, thereby creating competitive pressures on their
competitors based in the United States. As of March 2008,
"'[e]ight out of 10 of London's top law firms [were] already using or assessing external funding for litigation and arbitration
cases,

...

marking a dramatic move of third-party funding into

mainstream practice. ... ' Even [the U.S.-based firm] Skadden
[was] getting into the action, reportedly using third-party funding in an arbitration case."40

services. Id. at 38; see also Patrick Boardman, Brookfield Multiplex Limited v
International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd [2009] FCAFC 147,
WOTTON KEARNEY (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.wottonkearney.com.aui
publications.aspx?newsld= 10. This ruling has served to create a significant
logjam, as its implications threaten numerous ongoing litigations and affect
the availability of funding for future cases as well. Boardman, supra.The High
Court is expected to take up the issue in the future. Id.
37. See R (Factortame Ltd.) v. Sec'y of State for Transp., [2002] EWCA
(Civ) 932, [32], [2003] Q.B. 381 at 399 (Eng.).
38. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 655 (Eng.).
39. See id. at [40].
40. Ashby Jones, Third-PartyLitigationFunding Stepping Up in the U.K.,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2008, 5:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/
03/20/third-party-litigation-funding-stepping-up-in-UK (quoting Claire Ruckin
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In sum, these advancements have chipped away at the doctrine of champerty, at least as it pertains to third-party funding, and have created a global environment in which some jurisdictions enable litigants, including multinational litigants
who can comparison shop among international law firms, to
make use of litigation finance.
2.

Creation of a Secondary Market in Legal Claims
The rise of the litigation-funding industry (i.e., a primary
market in legal claims) had an additional effect besides competitive pressures on global law firms. The last couple of years
have also ushered in a secondary market in legal claims. Predominantly, this secondary market takes the form of litigationfunding firms going public-selling shares to the public and
listing on stock exchanges.4 1 But it is possible that in the foreseeable future we will also be witnessing the creation of a new
form of securities-legal-claims-backed securities. Reportedly,
some tort-litigation lenders are already in the practice of aggregating the claims they acquire and selling shares of the
composite funds; that is, they are engaged in a rudimentary
form of securitization. 42 Further support of the proposition that
securitization of this new asset class, namely legal claims and
defenses, may be forthcoming in the near future can be gleaned
from the fact that the first wave of litigation funding also generated a smattering of similar secondary trading in legal
claims. A few lawsuits were syndicated during the 1980s, with
some instances of syndication ending up in litigation.43 In addition, there is one case in which shares in future judgments
& Sofia Lind, External Funding Booms as Litigators Plot Upturn, LAW.COM
(Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1206009902544).
41. For example, Australia's IMF fund is traded on the Australian stock
exchange with a portfolio of litigation investments valued at one billion Australian dollars as of early 2007. See Martin, LitigationFinancing,supra note 7, at
107-09. A second Australian firm, Hillcrest Litigation Services, has very recently done an initial public offering. Caroline Binham, Juridica Attracts Investment as the First Specialist Litigation Fund to Float in UK, LAWYER, Jan. 14,
2008, available at http://www.thelawyer.com/juridica-attracts-investment-as
-the-first-specialist-litigation-fund-to-float-in-uk/130705.article ("Juridica's IPO
on AIM at the end of 2007 raised £80m, which will be invested in claims."). In
the United Kingdom, Juridica and the Burford Group are listed on the AIM
stock exchange. John O'Doherty, Litigation Fund Poised for AIM Debut, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 17, 2009, at 14.
42. See Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 7, at 796-97.
43. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 217 (2d
Cir. 1987).
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have been traded on Nasdaq. 44 The existence of a secondary
market in litigation claims, which is poised to grow, is the key
feature distinguishing not only the second wave of litigation
funding from the first, but also, as we shall see, third-party
funding from attorney-funding of litigation (the contingency
fee).
3. Effects of the Global Recession on the Rising Demand for
Litigation Funding
The global context fueling demand for third-party litigation
funding also includes the global economic crisis. Companies are
increasingly cautious about expending the costs of litigation. 45
The crisis has also given rise to an increased volume of legal
disputes regarding the legality of numerous practices that
caused the crisis. 46 Otherwise stated, recessions, including the
current one, produce more claimants who possess less funding
for, or at least less appetite to bear, litigation costs.
Additionally, in the aftermath of the crisis, institutional
investors are looking for new types of investments that are untainted by some of the problems which led to the crisis, or that
at least can be marketed as such to their own investors. As a
new asset class, legal claims provide just that. Moreover, legal
44. Margaret Cronin Fisk, 'Winstar' Litigants Bet on Future Damages
Awards, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at A19 ("Several savings and loan institutions involved in the Winstar litigation are selling shares in possible judgments on the Nasdaq stock exchange. . . . In the past, other banks had established trusts for shareholders, assigning them contingent rights in litigation[,]
... [but] 'this was rare, and you couldn't buy or sell these rights."' (quoting
Victor Lewkow, partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP)). Interviews
with executives in litigation investing firms also confirm that securitization is
being considered. The report on the Winstar litigation gives a peek at how
courtroom developments and judges' decisions may affect the value of stock
linked to litigation:
The price of the [] shares rose in late October after Congress passed
the 1999 federal budget, approving funds to pay the [I claims. But in
mid-November, when U.S. Claims Court Judge Robert H. Hodges
ruled that Cal Fed would not be able to recover damages under its
'expectations' theory, the price of one Cal Fed litigation stock dropped
25%, while the other declined 20%.
Id.
45. See Jonathan D. Glater, Billable Hours Giving Ground at Law Firms,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at Al, availableat 2009 WLNR 1784153 ("Clients
are more concerned about the budgets, more so than perhaps a year or two ago.'
(quoting Evan R. Chesler, presiding partner, Cravath, Swain & Moore LLP)).
46. See BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, supra note 10 ("[T]he sub-prime crisis in
the US is leading to an increased volume of underlying litigation in an effort to
apportion blame-and with it, legal liability.").
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claims are an asset class that is "not cyclically correlated with
bonds and equities." 47 For these very reasons in fact, litigation
is often viewed by large firms-and now by investors-as a
counter-cyclical practice; litigation departments are maintained
by corporate law firms to a large extent for diversification purposes. 48
The global recession is also accelerating the ascendance of
"alternative fee structures" as a substitute to the billable
hour. 49 Litigation funding represents one such alternative
modality. Instead of costly legal bills based on hours worked,
clients can shift the costs entirely onto investors.5 0 And law
firms face the prospect of easier collection from funders, whose
very investment consists of paying the firms' bills, rather than
a struggle to collect the fees owed them from clients reeling
from the recession.
The "incorporation movement"-changes in the laws of
some jurisdictions which allow investment in law firms-is
another development that is part of the environment.5 1 Major
law firms that in the past would not have considered "brokering" litigation funding for their clients are increasingly doing so
or considering doing so. 5 2 Like clients' increasing resistance to
the billable hour, this development creates pressure on attorneys' traditional pricing models. 53 Another related feature of
contemporary law-firm finance that may come to affect the
trend is that law firms can establish separate legal entities
47. See id.
48. See id.; cf. Binham, supra note 41 ("[Clommercial litigation is poised to
take off if the economy takes a nosedive. As Fields said: 'our business model is
fairly recession-proof."' (quoting Richard Fields, co-founder, Juridica Capital
Management)).
49. See generally Glater, supra note 45 (discussing the likelihood of alternative billing).
50. See BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, supra note 10 ("If you lose, the funding
company will pay the winning party's costs.").
51. See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 71-111 (Eng.); Frances Gibb,
Who Will Police the Lawyers Now? Only a Non-Lawyer Need Apply. . ., TIMES
ONLINE (Nov. 8, 2007), http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/aw/
columnists/article2831496.ece.
52. See Jones, supra note 40. The Canadian BridgePoint Financial Services firm funds both law firms, in Canada and the United Kingdom, and individual cases. See Grania Langdon-Down, Litigation Funding.An Overview of a
ContentiousArea of Growth, LAw Soc'y GAZETTE (London), May 21, 2009, http://

www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/litigation-funding-an-overview-of-a-contentious
-area-of-growth.
53. See Should You Buy Shares in a Law Firm?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23,
2008, at 81, available at 2008 WLNR 15899553.
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that function exclusively as funding firms and direct funding
business to that particular law firm.5 4
These economic forces and the burgeoning international litigation-finance industry are met with legal barriers in the form
of restrictive ethical rules that limit both the industry's growth
globally and, in particular, its penetration into the United
States. In addition, these prohibitions create uncertainty which
raises the costs of litigation finance, i.e., the costs clients have
to pay to secure such funding. The two main legal impediments
to litigation funding are the doctrine of champerty and the prohibition on attorney fee sharing with nonlawyers.5 5 These will
be discussed in turn.

54. This has been the solution to restrictions on other kinds of "multidisciplinary practices," defined as the practice of both law and a related discipline, such as accounting or private investigations under one roof, which is
prohibited by most states. See Jay S. Zimmerman & Matthew J. Kelly, From
the Trenches and Towers: MDPs After Enron/Andersen, 29 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 639, 644-47 (2004) (discussing the barriers imposed by ABA Model
Rule 5.4-which limits a lawyer's ability to run a business with a nonlawyerand the rise of subsidiary businesses of law firms); see also Stacy L. Brustin,
Legal Services Provision Through MultidisciplinaryPractice, 73 U. COLO. L.
REV. 787, 799-821 (2002) (same with regard to the nonprofit sector). There is
at least one reported instance of such a practice: Richard Fields and Timothy
Scrantom are co-principals of both Juridica's investment arm and of the law
firm of Fields & Scrantom, one of the firms to which Juridica will supply indirect investment in cases where plaintiffs either cannot have, or do not want,
direct investment. See Binham, supra note 41.
55.

See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2010) ("A law-

yer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer."). A secondary barrier is the prohibition on usury, which has largely been eliminated. Courts
that have had the opportunity to review such challenges to a funding agreement as usurious have largely dismissed such challenges given that an element of usury is that a lender can require the borrower to return the loan,
whereas funding agreements are nonrecourse agreements. See, e.g., AngloDutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 95-101 (Tex. Ct. App.
2006) (holding usury laws inapplicable because the repayment was contingent
only upon victory in the underlying suit). Another secondary barrier is the ethical prohibition on attorney solicitation, noted below. Generally, challenges to
third-party funding come to courts in one of two ways: a financed party wins,
refuses to pay, and either sues for rescission of the funding agreement or is
sued by the funder for breach of contract, or the opposing party gets wind of
the fact of third-party funding and brings a judicial challenge to the legality of
the arrangement. Courts are generally asked to invalidate these agreements
on two grounds, champerty and usury. For a summary of recent cases challenging third-party funding agreements, see Martin, Litigation Financing,supra note 7, at 87-95.
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II. A PROHIBITION ON LITIGATION FINANCE:
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND CONTEMPORARY
EFFECTS
This Part describes the ethical standards and rules of professional responsibility which, in most states, effectively prohibit third-party funding and greatly limit the penetration of
the industry into the United States. Importantly, they also contribute to the very systemic inequalities they were designed to
prevent. The primary barrier is the doctrine of maintenance
and champerty. A close second is the prohibition on attorney
fee sharing with non-attorneys, which prohibits funders from
contracting directly with attorneys. This Part places a special
emphasis on examining the policy considerations underlying
these restrictions as ultimately it is the policy considerations
that should inform the debate on the desirable legal regime
going forward. As a contrast, this Part offers some examples of
areas of law in which external funding and claim transfers are
permitted, with appropriate safeguards, due to overriding policy considerations. These are meant to illustrate that compelling
reasons to allow litigation funding-considerations such as
access to justice, private enforcement of law, and equality-ofarmS56-should lead our legal system to adapt and allow such
practices with the appropriate regulatory safeguards. This Part
concludes with an analysis of just such an overriding consideration-the weak bargaining power of entire categories of litigants and their consequent inability to play for rules the way
other more powerful actors do. This analysis supports the development of the legal regime suggested herein for the litigation-finance industry.
A. MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY

Champerty is defined as an "agreement to divide litigation
proceeds between the owner of the litigated claim and a party
unrelated to the lawsuit who supports or helps enforce the
claim" or, more pejoratively, as "an agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant's claim as consideration

56. "Private law enforcement" is the enforcement of the law by private
parties pursuing legal action for profit. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669 (1986).

HeinOnline -- 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1286 2010-2011

2011]

THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING

1287

for receiving part of any judgment proceeds."5 7 It is a form of
maintenance whereby "assistance in prosecuting or defending a
lawsuit [is] given to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide
interest in the case."5 8 Champerty is an ancient concept with
roots in Greek and Roman law that derives its name from the
Old French "champart," which was a feudal-era land grant
scheme.59
The New York Court of Errors' 1824 case Thallhimer v.
Brinckerhoff6 reviewed the unjust social and flawed legal context that necessitated the doctrine at a time when the administration of public justice in medieval England was weak and corrupt:
[Tihe English doctrines of maintenance and champerty arose from
causes unique to English life. The [New York Court of Errors in
Thallhimer] especially pointed to a statute from the 32nd year of
Henry VIII, "to repress the practices of many who when they thought
they had title or right to any land, for the furtherance of their pretended right, conveyed their interest in some part thereof to great
persons, and with their countenance, did oppress the possessors."
... What had happened was that "small men" transferred their rights
of action in property disputes to "great men" in order to get the great
men's support at law. Because the legal establishment was weak at
the time, the great men could overwhelm the court, thus enabling the
little man to get his land claim and the great men to get their share.
In other words, champerty was a means by which great men increased
their power at the expense of the courts ofjustice.61

Interestingly, in modern American history, the doctrine of
champerty has also played a role in social struggles. Specifically, it has been used to stifle social progress:
In the middle 1950's seven southern states suddenly discovered a
need to reinvigorate and extend existing champerty, maintenance
and solicitation rules. The flurry of legislation came on the heels of
the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education in
which five civil rights organizations appeared as amicus curiae. The
two events were not unconnected. The action of the legislatures was a

57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009).
58. Id. at 1039.
59. See Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigationfor Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529,
1543-46 (1996) (reviewing the history and development of champerty law).
60. 3 Cow. 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
61. William R. Long, Champerty and Contingent Fees Part III,
DRBILLLONG.COM (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.drbilllong.com/LegalHistoryll/
ChampertyIII.html (emphasis added) (quoting Thallhimer, 3 Cow. at 644)
(clarifying that where you have strong instruments of justice you do not need
the doctrine; courts can oversee and disallow officious intermeddling when
there is a risk that the judicial process will be perverted).
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vigorous political response to the success of these organizations before
the courts. 62

The modern policy rationale most often cited in support of
the imposition of champerty restrictions includes a desire to
discourage excessive, unnecessary, or speculative litigationoften associated with third parties seeking profit, rather than
redress, through suits. 63 Another rationale for the restriction is
a desire to prevent unfair dealings, in which a party with a
dominant bargaining position is able to realize excessive profits
when purchasing another party's claim. 64 Perhaps the best
modern articulation of the concerns underlying the champerty
doctrine can be found in the concurring opinion in Fostif, the
leading Australian case regarding third-party funding. In that
case, the court stated:
Institutions like [the funders], which are not solicitors and employ no
lawyers with a practising certificate, do not owe the same ethical duties. No solicitor could ethically have conducted the advertising campaign which [the funders] got [the plaintiff] to conduct. The basis on
which [the funders] are proposing to charge is not lawfully available
to solicitors. Further, organisations like [the funders] play more shadowy roles than lawyers. Their role is not revealed on the court file.
Their appearance is not announced in open court. No doubt sanctions
for contempt of court and abuse of process are available against them
in the long run, but with much less speed and facility than is the case
with legal practitioners. In short, the court is in a position to supervise litigation conducted by persons who are parties to it; it is less

62. Comment, The South's Amended Barratry Laws: An Attempt to End
Group Pressure Through the Courts, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1613 (1963); see also
ConstitutionalLaw: First Amendment Limitations on State Regulation of the
Legal Profession-Litigationas a Protected Form of Expression, 1963 DUKE
L.J. 545, 545 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), for the proposition
that litigation to enforce civil rights has been held by the Supreme Court to be
a form of expression protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
Scholars have recently commented on the Supreme Court's ruling on the right
to sue as a First Amendment right in the context of litigation funding. See
Jones, supra note 40; see also Anthony O'Rourke, The Political Economy of
CriminalProcedureLitigation, 44 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), availableat
http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1573769 (offering a political economics analysis of
the ability of a concentrated (and coordinated) impact litigation sector to affect
the agenda and precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of criminal
procedure). For another critical perspective on what are perhaps the true underlying rationales for contemporary restrictions such as maintenance and solicitation, consider Galanter's view that the "canons of ethics," and in particular prohibitions on solicitations and referral fees (of which fee-splitting
arrangements are a type), disparately impact lawyers in the "lower echelons"
of the profession who typically represent small clients. Galanter, supra note 6,
at 116-17 & nn.50-51.
63. See Comment, supra note 62, at 1629 n.75.
64. See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (1VIass. 1997).
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easy to supervise litigation, one side of which is conducted by a party,
while on the other side there are only nominal parties, the true controller of that side of the case being beyond the court's direct control.65

Today, while a minority of states have abandoned champerty restrictions, the majority of states retain and enforce the
prohibition with varying degrees of zeal.66 Among the states
still recognizing champerty restrictions, Minnesota represents
those states which continue to rigorously apply them. In Johnson v. Wright, for instance, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed the common-law history of champerty in the state and,
in conjunction with its core ruling, stated that "an agreement in
which [a party] had no interest otherwise, and when he is in no
way related to the party he aids, is champertous and void as
against public policy." 67 The court of appeals also squarely addressed the move towards modernization or elimination of
champerty law by other states. 68 Dismissing the respondent's
arguments regarding existing alternatives to champerty restrictions, the court of appeals wrote:
Although there are safeguards in place to alleviate the potential evils
associated with champertous agreements, respondent fails to provide
a compelling reason to completely abandon the doctrine. As an error
correcting court, we do not presume to abandon the champerty doctrine simply because a few states have chosen to do so.69

Other states also continue to apply champerty restrictions
with little apparent modernization. Delaware maintains that,
under common law, an agreement is champertous whenever an
assignee has no interest, either legal or equitable, in an assigned cause of action prior to the assignment. 70 Further, "[i]t is
the duty of the court to dismiss a case in which the evidence
discloses that the assignment of the cause of action sued upon
was tainted with champerty." 71
Conversely, New York represents those more progressive
states which, while not abandoning the doctrine, have taken a
cautious approach to its application. New York state law prohibits the purchase of debt, a thing in action, or any claim or
65. Campbells Cash & Carry Pty. Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR
386, 487 (Austl.) (Callinan & Heydon, JJ., concurring).
66. See Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to
State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1301-16 (2002) (providing a review of
the modern legal landscape of champerty law).
67. Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
68. See id. at 680.
69. Id.
70. See Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 829-30 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994).
71. Id.
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demand, among other things, "with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon."72 Viewing
champerty as, from its inception, a doctrine of more limited
scope in the American legal system, New York courts have typically been hesitant to find that an action is champertous as a
matter of law.7 3 The Court of Appeals of New York established
a "primary purpose" test for determining whether conduct is
champertous. 74 As stated by the court of appeals in Bluebird
Partners,L.P. v. FirstFidelity Bank, N.A., the primary-purpose
test is derived from a simple textual analysis of New York law
and requires that an acquisition be made "for the purpose (as
contrasted to a purpose) of bringing an action or proceeding." 75
In its application, the primary-purpose test does not require a
third party to make an acquisition for the sole purpose of litigation, but appears to require litigation to be a major or motivating factor.76
As mentioned, a minority of states such as Massachusetts
and South Carolina have abandoned champerty altogether. In
Saladini v. Righellis, the Massachusetts Supreme Court declined to void an agreement despite explicitly stating that it
was champertous.7 7 Addressing the application of champerty
restrictions under common law, the court stated that, "We also
are no longer persuaded that the champerty doctrine is needed
to protect against the evils once feared: speculation in lawsuits,
the bringing of frivolous lawsuits, or financial overreaching by
a party of superior bargaining position. There are now other
devices that more effectively accomplish these ends."7 8 Similarly, in Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. Partnership,the South Carolina Supreme Court abandoned champerty, stating that "We
abolish champerty as a defense because we believe it no longer
is required to prevent the evils traditionally associated with the
doctrine as it developed in medieval times." 7 9
In sum, there appears to be a growing discontent with
champerty restrictions in some quarters, but in most states
champerty remains entrenched. A second regulatory barrier
72. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 2009).
73. See Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 709 N.Y.S.2d 865,
870 (2000) (citing Sprung v. Jaffe, 3 N.Y.2d 539 (1957)).
74. See id. at 736.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997).
78. Id. at 1226-27.
79. See Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 279 (S.C. 2000).
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which has received virtually no attention in the context of litigation funding is the prohibition on fee sharing. That topic is
taken up next.
B. THE PROHIBITION ON FEE SHARING WITH NONLAWYERS

A natural market solution to the lack of access to justice
resulting from plaintiffs' inability to finance meritorious litigation could be for contingent fee lawyers and the Plaintiffs' Bar
to go beyond attorneys' funding of litigation toward lawyers
seeking outside investors to fund their clients' litigation. That
would allow attorneys and firms to increase their capitalization
and grow their firm, diversify, and spread the risk as does any
business.
Lawyer compensation of nonlawyers for referrals or otherwise sharing fees with nonlawyers is, however, universally understood to run afoul of several ethical and professional standards and is widely prohibited.80 Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer or
law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer." 81 The
rule has been widely adopted by states with only a few exceptions. 82 Therefore, since the return on outside capital investment in any particular case (as opposed to investing in a law
firm as a whole) would come from the recovery and fees collected by the attorneys, such capitalization is barred by the
rules of professional responsibility.
As stated in the comments to Rule 5.4, this prohibition is
intended to "protect the lawyer's professional independence of
judgment."8 3 Regulators are also concerned by other client interests protected by the rules of ethics. Fee splitting is viewed
as running the risk of granting nonlawyers control over the
practice of law or potentially enabling lay persons to practice
law without authorization. 84 It is also feared that the prospect

80. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Conflicts of Interest in
Lawyer Referral Arrangements with Nonlawyer Professionals, 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 197, 205-06 (2008).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2003).

82. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Dates of Adoption, ABA
CENTER FOR PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
responsibility/publications/model rules-of professional conduct/chronolist_
state adopting-model rules.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
83.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt. (2003).

84. Id.; see also Gassman v. State Bar, 553 P.2d 1147, 1551 (Cal. 1976)
(noting that fee-splitting arrangements pose "serious danger to the best inter-
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of receiving referral fees from lawyers would encourage nonlawyers to solicit prospective clients for practicing lawyers and
thereby encourage the collusion of lawyers and laymen to violate attorney prohibitions on direct solicitation of clients.8 5
The prohibition on fee sharing is being avoided by the new
institutional funders by contracting directly with the clients,
not with their attorneys.86 The legality of this arrangement
generally, and of particular clauses involved, such as those allowing a funder to "monitor" the progress of a litigation and to
discontinue funding mid-litigation (i.e., arguably to control the
litigation), have not yet been tested by the courts.87
As will be discussed in Part III, excluding the attorneys
from having a direct relationship with the funders may not be
the best way to ensure the clients' very interests that the
champerty doctrine and the prohibition on fee splitting seek to
protect. Though it is important to note that while litigation
funding and any claim transfer involved generally are prohibited, both are allowed in other contexts.
C. PERMISSIBLE LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER

1. Contingency Fees
There are several instances where overriding policy considerations prevail over the restrictions and litigation funding
and claim transfer are permitted. First and foremost is the contingency fee, a fee payable to the attorney only if the outcome of
the representation is successful.8 8 Contingency fees usually
take the form of a percentage of a recovery, but they do not
ests" of a lawyer's clients, and risk control of clients' matters by a layperson);
O'Hara v. Ahgren, Blumenfeld & Kempster, 537 N.E.2d 730, 734 (Ill. 1989).
85. See O'Hara,537 N.E.2d at 734 ("[Flee-splitting arrangements promote
solicitation of clients." (citing In re Bonafield, 383 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 1978)));
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2003) (prohibiting direct solicitation
of clients).
86. This topic was discussed at the District of Columbia Bar seminar
titled "Third-Party Funding in Arbitration" held on June 30, 2009. Funding
firms also appear to be partly mitigating the effects of the rule of prohibition
by being "offshore," incorporating and listing overseas (though, operating in
the United States as well). The uncertainty as to whether courts will uphold
litigation funding if challenged arguably contributes to the speculative nature
of the investment and therefore to its price (both the price to the client and the
price of publicly traded shares of litigation-funding firms).
87. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the fact patterns
and legal claims that have come before the courts).
88. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS:
CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2004).
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necessarily have to be so. 8 9 Since the contingency fee and its
sibling, the class action, are key features of American civil litigation, the literature arguing for and against them is vast and
wide. 90
One scholar has summarized the contentious debate surrounding contingency fees in the following manner:
Contingency fees are praised as the average person's "key to the
court-house" and attacked as the cause of excessive litigiousness, frivolous lawsuits, and greedy trial lawyers finding new ways to bring
corporate America to its knees .... Trial lawyers are blamed for contributing to, if not causing, the supposed "endless tide of litigation"
.... They encourage the "blame game," whereby individuals do not
take responsibility for their own lives but look to others for undue
compensation and thereby increase insurance and other costs to everyone. These lawyers continue to enrich themselves through windfall
fees in cases such as tobacco litigation. They engage in activities that
contort the justice system to advance their own interests, contributing
to excessive adversarialism. And they take advantage of naive injury
victims, charging high fees to compensate for the risk they are undertaking when there is no doubt that the victim will recover damages.91

Because the similarities between attorney funding and
third-party funding are extensive, most of the discourse surrounding litigation funding is characterized by what some
economists call an "attribute substitution": a cognitive bias
whereby individuals who need to make a complex judgmenthere, regarding the desirability of the novel phenomenon of litigation finance-substitute that complex judgment for a more
easily calculated heuristic. 92 In our case, the easiest calculation
is the desirability of contingency fees. In other words, commentators simply apply their preconceived views of contingency
fees to litigation finance.
But third-party funding is different from attorney funding
in several important ways. One key difference is that funders
89. See id.
90. See infra notes 91, 166 and accompanying text. While generally rejected or greatly restricted abroad, the practice of entering into these contingency fee arrangements is unquestionably permissible in the United States,
with limited requirements on reasonableness and client disclosures. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2003).
91. See IN LITIGATION: DO THE "HAVEs" STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 1-2
(Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan Silbey eds., 2003) (internal references omitted) (reviewing the literature for and against contingency fees and class action reform).
92. See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531,
532-33 (2005) (arguing that attribute substitution is pervasive when people
reason about moral, political, or legal matters, and given a difficult, novel
problem in these areas, people search for a more familiar related problem and
apply its solution to the harder problem).
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are not providing a service for a fee but rather are investing in
an asset. Another important difference is that litigation funding has the potential to benefit corporate America as much as it
does the Plaintiffs' Bar and its clientele. Litigation funders are
likely to develop ongoing relationships with both sides of this
great divide.
An additional set of differences arises because law firms
and finance firms are very different types of business entities.
Consequently, litigation-finance firms are likely to have different investment goals, strategies, and competencies than law
firms and are likely to generate different agency problems.
Specifically, finance firms are not subject to the constraints imposed by the canons of professional responsibility. 93 This means
that they can take on matters that conflict, can solicit clients,
and have nonlawyers in management positions. The latter
speaks to another notable difference-governance structures.
Funders, unlike law firms, have boards of directors. Funding
firms do not have to limit themselves to the practice of law and
may gain advantages through synergies with other financial
products and services they offer. They can accept alternative
forms of compensation, such as equity in intellectual property
or exploration and drilling rights, and can join in the ventures
of their clients. Last, but not least, there are differences in
ownership structures and corporate finance options. Funding
firms can-and do-raise investments from retail and institutional investors; they are likely to engage in secondary trading
of the litigation stakes they purchase, and they may in the future engage in securitization of bundled legal claims. 94
These differences help explain the market gap left by the
Plaintiffs' Bar that litigation-funding firms fill. Additionally,
the importance of these differences, in particular the development of secondary markets in legal claims, will become apparent in the next Part as the discussion turns to the influence of
93. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003) (applying the rules of
professional conduct to lawyers).
94. See, e.g., Press Release, Burford Capital, Burford Capital Completes
$130 million IPO (Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.burfordcapital.com/
pdfs/Burford%20Capital%20completes%20$130%20million%201PO%20-%2016%
200ctober%202009.pdf (announcing the successful placement of eighty million
shares in an initial public offering of a publicly traded litigation-finance firm);
Press Release, Juridica Investment Ltd., Trading Update (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.juridicainvestments.com/media-centre/press-releases/2010/
01-feb-10.aspx (disclosing the successes of the publicly traded litigationfinance firm's litigation financing investments).
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these unique characteristics on bargaining dynamics and,
therefore, on the social function of litigation.
2. Insurance
A second major departure from champerty restrictions and
the underlying concerns is insurance law. Insurance law allows
for insurance contracts that include subrogation clauses
through which the insured gives the insurer the right to sue for
injuries covered by the policy.9 5 Moreover, as discussed in Part
IV, insurance law is relevant not only as an example of departure from the prohibition on claim transfer but also because defense transfer is functionally equivalent to after-the-event insurance. 96 Finally, insurance provides a pertinent analogy
because there is a secondary market in securitized insurance
contracts, which may mirror a possible market in legal-claimsbacked securities.
Insurance is a cornerstone of modern economies:
When uncertainty is present in economic activity, insurance is commonly found. Indeed, Kenneth Arrow [the Nobel laureate] has identified a kind of market failure with the absence of markets to provide
insurance against some uncertain events. Arrow stated that "the welfare case for insurance of all sorts is overwhelming. It follows that the
government should undertake insurance where the market, for whatever reason, has failed to emerge."97

In order to overcome the agency problems-specifically, the
moral hazard-inherent in the provision of insurance, insurers
enter into complex contractual agreements with insureds.9 8
95. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 698 (3rd ed.
2001) (noting that with the protections granted by subrogation, insurers are
essentially able to "stand in the shoes" of an insured and assert the insured's
rights against a third party, thus allowing them to recoup expenses paid to the
insured).
96. See infra Part IV (explaining that insurance is the transfer of risk
away from one party by distributing the risk among a sizable group of participants, and defining after-the-event insurance as insurance used to fund a lawsuit once litigation is already anticipated or has commenced).
97. See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58
AM. ECON. REV. 531, 531 (1968) (emphasis added).
98. Moral hazard, generally, is a type of agency problem in which one party, the agent, is responsible for the interests of another, the principal, but has
an incentive to put its own interests first. Kevin Dowd, Moral Hazard and the
Financial Crisis, 29 CATO J. 141, 142 (2009), available at http://www.cato
.org/pubs/journal/cj29nl/cj29nl-12.pdf. The agent, who is insulated from risk,
may behave differently from the way it would behave if it would be fully exposed to the risk. See id. In the insurance context, moral hazard refers to "the
tendency of insurance protection to alter an individual's motive to prevent
loss. This affects expenses for the insurer and therefore, ultimately, the cost of
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These agreements create complex relationships among insurer,
insured, and third parties. They also create a host of associated
rights and obligations, some of which are unique to the insurance context. 99 At the heart of the liability insurance arrangement is an insurer's promise to defend an insured against covered claims.100 Reciprocally, the insurer-a third party-takes
an interest in and control over the litigation. 10 1 This takeover of
the litigation is not only permissible but also in fact facilitated
by the applicable law. 102 This common scenario introduces a
third party into the traditional attorney-client relationship.
With the insurer directly paying the attorney for representing
the insured, doors open to conflicts of interest between insurer
and insured, and between insurer and attorney.10 3 This can
lead to diminished client control or less independence in the attorney's judgment. In one possible scenario, an insurance company may wish to accept a settlement offer and avoid the risk
of litigation, while an insured may seek to litigate as a perceived means of vindicating himself or defending his reputation. 104
3. Other Permissible Claim Transfers
Perhaps the most obvious, indeed paradigmatic, case of
permissible claim transfers is the everyday practice of assigning contractual rights to third parties under general contract
law. Unless prohibited by law or by provision of contract, parties are typically free to assign their contractual rights to others.10 5 Whether an assignment entails the mere transfer of the
coverage for individuals." Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance,93
Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979).
99.

See Shavell, supra note 98, at 541, 544 (discussing the different effects

on parties to insurance agreements, which vary based on how the individual
agreement is crafted).
100.

See id. at 541 (characterizing "insurance protection" in terms of "ex-

penses for the insurer").
101. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 3-5 (2003) (explaining generally the insurance company's duty
to "tak[e] care of insured losses").

102. See id. at 25.
103.

See id. at 4 (outlining some of the conflicts of interest that necessarily

pervade the insurer-insuree relationship).
104. See JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 916 (4th ed.
2003) (providing a thorough discussion of insurance defenses and conflicts of
interest).
105. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 47 (1964) (discussing
the assignable nature of contracts); see also Sebok, supra note 7 (providing an

HeinOnline -- 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1296 2010-2011

2011]

THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING

1297

right to receive payment from a purchaser or the large-scale assignment of rights and obligations pursuant to a merger and
acquisition deal, the practice is fundamental to contract law
and is an aspect of the freedom of contract.
Another well-known example of sale and transfer of legal
claims is debt collection. When a debtor fails to make payments
on a debt his creditor may sell that debt to a third party, commonly known as a distressed-debt purchaser.106 Importantly, if
the debt purchaser so chooses he may seek a judgment in
court. 10 7 This is analogous to the interest in a judgment that a
litigation funder obtains. 108 Similar to the selling of claims as
part of the debt collection process, by virtue of federal legislation, claims against bankrupt entities may also be sold to third
parties as part of the court-supervised bankruptcy process. 109
This practice is somewhat speculative and is generally engaged
in by specialized institutional investors. 110
Somewhat less well-known are qui tam actions that permit
private parties-specifically, whistleblowers who report wrongdoing in government agencies-to bring suit on behalf of the
government and to retain a portion of the award.111 Statutory
in nature, qui tam laws are typically viewed as state-mandated
in-depth discussion of the relationship between assignability of claims and litigation finance).
106. See Richard M. Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2008) (providing an overview of
the debt collection process).
107. Id.
108. Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV.
1609, 1645 (2009).
109. Id. (discussing bankruptcy code provision 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006),
which grants bankruptcy courts broad discretion, which courts have used to
void transfers, and section 3001(e) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that require proof of any transference of a claim to be filed with the court).
Interestingly, commercial third-party litigation funding in Australia, the pioneering jurisdiction, grew out of a 1995 statutory exception for insolvency practitioners. See AuSTL. STANDING COMM. OF THE ATTORNEYS-GEN., LITIGATION

FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA 4-5 (2006), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw
.gov. auilawlink/legislationpolicy/llpd.nsf/vwFiles/LitigationFundingDiscussion
paperMay06.pdf/$file/LitigationFundingDiscussionpaperMayO6.pdf.
110. See Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims
Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 569, 572
(2002).
111. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 769 (2000) (involving the False Claims Act, which grants standing to "a private person ... for the person and for the United States Government against the alleged false claimant, in the name of the Government" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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mechanisms of private enforcement against public wrongs in
the public interest. 112 Like third-party funding, qui tam laws
create a partial assignment of legal interests-the government's
legal interests-to private parties. 113 As such, they are particularly analogous to third-party funding of sovereigns in international arbitration.
Finally, life settlements (the sale of an existing life insurance policy to a third party) and the closely related viatical settlements (the purchase of a terminally ill person's life insurance) are practices that permit insureds to collect an amount
greater than the surrender value of the policy but less than the
face amount paid upon death. 114 Purchasers of life settlements-commercial investors-are responsible for paying the
premiums due on the insurance and in return are provided a
new type of investment in which the return is heavily dependent upon how long the insured lives. 115 As such, they give rise
to a similar, or even heightened, knee-jerk reaction of distaste
and disapproval as third-party funding of litigation. 116 The proponents of the practice, however, cite the ability of the insured,
often the very old or very sick, to cash in on their life insurance
while still alive and use it to enhance their standard of care or
standard of living. 117
At the outer edges, one can even imagine a form of litigation funding undertaken by nonprofits. Indeed, even the provision of pro bono services eliminates litigation costs. It therefore

112. See id. at 774-76 (discussing the history of qui tam actions in the
United States and England).
113. See United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S. Ct.
2230, 2236 (2009) (discussing qui tam actions under the False Claims Act); see
also id. (providing an overview of qui tam legislation).
114. See Recent Innovations in Securitization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on CapitalMkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 51-62 (2009) (statement of Paula Dubberly, Associate
Director, Division of Corporate Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter Recent Innovations in Securitization Hearing] (providing
background on life settlements and noting that life settlements have become so
prevalent that there are now efforts to securitize them); see also Miriam R. Albert, Selling Death Short: The Regulatory and Policy Implications of Viatical
Settlements, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1013, 1017-22 (1998) (relating the historical development of viatical settlements).
115. See Recent Innovations in SecuritizationHearing,supra note 114, at 53.
116. See Albert, supra note 114, at 1015 (indicating that the perception of
some is that viatication is "ghoulish").
117. See id. (detailing the benefits offered by viatical settlements).
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alters the power dynamics among attorneys, their clients, and
opposing parties. 118
To conclude, examples abound of areas of law in which the
benefits of claim transfers and litigation funding with the appropriate safeguards trump champerty concerns. In addition,
foreign jurisdictions have found that the considerations underlying the champerty doctrine and similar barriers to litigation
funding are either outdated or outweighed by the increased
access to justice such funding can provide. They have thus
moved from prohibition to regulation. The next Part first suggests another compelling reason to move from prohibition to
regulation of litigation funding-its equalizing effects on litigants' bargaining power and ability to affect rule change. Secondly, it provides a bargaining analysis that reveals agency
problems that would need to be considered under a regime of
regulation. Before doing so, the following section describes the
structural limitation on one-shotters' ability to play for rule
change that the current prohibition contributes to.
D. SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF THE PROHIBITION ON LITIGATION
FINANCE

As we have seen, prohibitions on agreements to acquire an
interest in litigation were originally intended to stem corruption in the judicial process and maintain the integrity of the
practice of law. Concerns regarding the integrity of the profession included fears that third parties could effectively control
litigation, that attorneys or clients could share confidential information with the third party-raising both ethical and practical concerns-and that disagreement could arise among the
parties and impose conflicting duties on attorneys. The prohibitions were also thought to limit frivolous lawsuits and to better
align the interests of the attorney with those of the client.
While the prohibitions were meant to protect clients and
the courts from being overrun by Great Men, they have, in fact,
helped to achieve the opposite. The exclusion of have-nots from
full use of the court system allows today's Great Men-society's
haves-to overrun the courts. Virtually all of the literature arguing in favor of permitting litigation funding does so on the
118. See Steinitz, supra note 21, at 213 (discussing pro bono services and
the attorney-client relationship). For a discussion of how problems of control and
agenda setting affect impact litigation (i.e., litigation by nonprofit organizations), see generally Ann Southworth, Business Planningfor the Destitute? Lawyers as Facilitatorsin Civil Rights and Poverty Practice,1996 WIS. L. REV. 1121.
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basis that it will reverse the exclusion of have-nots from the
courthouse. 119 This Article will focus on an overlooked aspect of
litigation finance: its potential to significantly reduce the Great
Men's grip on the courts.
That such a grip exists can be seen most clearly in Marc
Galanter's classical account of why society's haves come out
ahead in litigation.120 Galanter famously argued that "the basic
architecture of the legal system creates and limits the possibilities of using the system as a means of redistributive (that is,
systematically equalizing) change." 12 1 In so doing, Galanter
created a typology of litigants and showed how the outcome of
litigation is affected by the type of litigants involved. He identified two types. The first are one-shotters-claimants who have
only occasional recourse to the courts. 122 These are usually
smaller players and the stakes represented by the outcomes of
their cases may be high relative to their total worth. 123 Their
cases are either too large (relative to the one-shotter's size) or
too small (relative to the cost of litigation) to be managed routinely and rationally.124 The second type are the repeat players
who are engaged in many similar litigations over time, have
had and anticipate repeated litigation, have low stakes in the
outcome of any one case, and have the resources to pursue their
long-term interests. 125 The repeat player has the following
structural advantages over the one-shotter:
[Repeat players] have advance intelligence; they are able to structure
the next transaction and build a record .... [Repeat players] develop
expertise and have ready access to specialists. They enjoy economies
of scale and have low start-up costs for any case.

. .

. [Repeat players]

have opportunities to develop facilitative informal relations with institutional incumbents .

..

. [The repeat player's] interest is in his

"bargaining reputation"..... [Repeat players] can play the odds. The
larger the matter at issue looms for [the one-shotter], the more likely
he is to adopt a minimax strategy (minimize the probability of maximum loss). Assuming that the stakes are relatively smaller for [repeat players], they can adopt strategies calculated to maximize gain
over a long series of cases, even where this involves the risk of maximum loss in some cases. Repeat players can play for rules as well as
immediate gains .... [A repeat player] may be willing to trade off
tangible gain in any one case for rule gain .... We would then expect
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See supra Part III.
Galanter, supra note 6, at 125 fig.3.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 98.
See id.
Id. at 97.
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repeat players to "settle" cases where they expected unfavorable rule
outcomes. . . . [One-shotters] should be willing to trade off the possibility of making "good law" for tangible gain.126

Given these structural advantages, argues Galanter, neither litigation nor rule change proves effective from a redistributive perspective since one-shotters do not get to create rule
change through litigation. 127 This diminished ability to fully
participate in society comes in addition to the familiar problem
of lack of funding and so-called litigation fatigue-depleted
monetary and emotional resources needed to pursue lengthy
litigation-which leads one-shotters to settle meritorious cases
at a discount or to refrain from bringing them altogether.128
Only change at the level of parties is likely to generate change
at other levels including, importantly, the level of rulechange. 129
In short, repeat players both understand the system and
have the long-term perspective that allows them to game the
system. One-shotters, on the other hand, may not have enough
experience with the system to understand it. Even when they
do, they may not have the desire or the flexibility to risk a
short-term loss in favor of a long-term gain that will likely accrue to someone else.13 0 In addition, one-shotters are likely to
overweigh the potential for extreme, but unlikely events (like a
catastrophic judgment), while underweighing the prospect of
average events. 131 Lowering the potential for loss, via a risktransfer mechanism, allows funded parties to pursue a more
aggressive and more rational bargaining stance and to avoid
unnecessary discounts. 132

126. Id. at 98-103 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 95.
128. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, 'Most Cases Settle"- Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1349 (1994); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supranote 8, at 971-72.
129. See Galanter, supra note 6, at 150. Apparently, this is also true thirtyfive years later. See Karyl A. Kinsey & Loretta J. Stalans, Which "Haves"
Come Out Ahead and Why?, in IN LITIGATION, supra note 91, at 138.
130. See Galanter, supra note 6, at 98-101.
131. See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 42 (1980).
132. See Galanter, supra note 6, at 98-101 (relating lack of high risk to a
higher potential for deliberately planned strategies).
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III. LITIGATION FINANCING CHANGING THE GAME:
WHEN LITIGATION CEASES TO BE EXPENSIVE AND
UNCERTAIN
A. A NOTE ON TAXONOMY
The current discourse on litigation funding in its entirety
debates the merits and demerits of litigation funding en masse,
as if there is one type of funding in question. 13 3 But to understand how litigation funding may alter the systemic inequities
described above, one must employ a nuanced analysis that
treats litigation not monolithically, but as a combination of the
type of claim, the type of funder, and the type of client. These
three factors can be further broken down in the following manner. First, the type of claim funded varies as a defense or a
plaintiff's claim, by the area of law, and by the kind of process
(litigation or arbitration, domestic or international). Second,
the types of funders possible are commercial funders (institutional or individual), political funders (e.g., donor governments
in international arbitration), and public funders (e.g., nongovernmental organizations). 134 Finally, the type of client in
question can be an individual plaintiff, a class (represented by
counsel), a corporation, or a sovereign. Any analysis of litigation funding must first classify the type of litigation in question
based on these three factors.
Particularly significant is the classification of litigation
funding into two overarching categories-defense funding and
claim funding. Indeed, one of third-party funding's distinctive
features is that, unlike changes at the level of parties like class
action arrangements, litigation funding can be used by both
plaintiffs and defendants to improve their ability to bargain.
Among other things, this makes it more politically viable than
class action reform or other contemplated reforms. But litiga-

tion funding functions very differently on each side of the divide. Claim funding functions as a form of finance whereas defense funding functions as a form of insurance.
For example, readers' intuition regarding the desirability
of the litigation funding described in the examples in the opening of the article probably depends on the funder in question:
China's Sovereign Wealth fund, an oil company, a wealthy and
politically motivated individual, or an investment company. It
133. This is probably due to the conflation of litigation finance and contingency fees. See supra text accompanying note 92.
134. This Article focuses only on the first category-commercial funders.
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similarly may depend on the funded party: the government of a
developing country, a large corporation, or indigent villagers in
Angola. Additionally, intuitions are probably influenced by the
subject matter of the litigation: proprietary information regarding sensitive American military technologies, national boundaries, a securities class action, sexual harassment, or environmental and human rights abuses.
B. PARTIES' ABILITY TO "PLAY FOR RULES"

The rest of this Part shows how litigation funding can ameliorate the systemic inequalities described above-achieving
Galanter's change at the level of the parties-by analyzing its
effects on bargaining dynamics and ability to play for rule
change for different combination of claims and clients. Relating
the taxonomy above to Galanter's categories from Part III,
many consider individuals serving as plaintiffs to be paradigmatic one-shotters and corporations to be paradigmatic repeat
players. In addition, this Article will introduce the notions of
modified one-shotters and modified repeat players. These concepts will be elaborated upon in detail in the following pages. In
summary, modified one-shotters are parties that have low play
repetition but nonetheless enjoy some of the benefits that
usually come with repeat play. Modified repeat players are
players who, while playing the litigation game repeatedly,
nonetheless do not reap the full benefits that repeat play may
afford.
These two concepts are important to the analysis because
at the heart of the following argument is the idea that litigation
funding has the potential to transform both one-shotters (havenots) and repeat players (haves) into modified repeat players
and to level the playing field. In a nutshell, by compounding
the bargaining power of one-shotters and modified one-shotters
(such as individuals and sovereigns) while decreasing the bargaining power of repeat players (such as corporations) both of
whom must cede some power to the funders, litigation funding
would, in essence, transform all types of parties into different
types of modified repeat players. This potentially increases oneshotters' and modified one-shotters' ability to play for rules
more than substantive legislative reform would. However, the
potential equalizing effect of litigation funding is hampered by
two factors: (1) the emergence of secondary markets in legal
claims, and (2) the fragmentation of the triangular attorneyclient-funder relationships. Both of these factors introduce
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agency problems that undercut the full equalizing potential of
litigation funding. These concepts are illustrated by the following figure, which shows the parties to a funded litigation in the
context of the (potentially) limiting factors noted above.
Attorney/dl entifunder relationship

Secondar,NjarketS

The following sections describe the transformation of oneshotters, modified one-shotters, and repeat players into different forms of modified repeat players as well as the potential
leveling effect and attendant agency problems.
1. Individual, Class, and Sovereign Plaintiffs as Modified
Repeat Players
Litigation financiers seek investment in the claims or defenses of four types of parties. First, they seek to invest in
claims and defenses of corporations, which are the paradigmatic repeat players. Second, they seek to invest in claims of individual plaintiffs, who are the paradigmatic one-shotters. Third,
they seek to invest in the claims of classes. Classes are comprised of aggregate one-shotters who, via the aggregation and
funding process, become modified one-shotters. As discussed
below, the class's distinctive features, including the alignment
with a repeat-player firm, gives these individuals some, but not
all, of the bargaining advantages of repeat play. Finally, litigation funders may invest in claims of sovereigns in international
arbitration. Sovereigns, whose distinctive features are discussed below, can also be thought of as modified one-shotters as
they enjoy some extra-legal leverage afforded them by their
special role and heft. The following paragraphs expound on the
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effects that third-party funders may have on the ability of these
four types of litigants to play for rules given each type's unique
characteristics. Where applicable, the effects of the area of law
in question and of the process are also discussed.
One-shotters' (i.e., individual plaintiffs') bargaining positions will be most radically transformed by litigation funding as
plaintiffs are transformed from one-shotters to modified repeat
players. By allying themselves with repeat-player funders,
these plaintiffs will now reap the benefits of economies of scale,
accumulated expertise, and a limited ability to play for rules, in
addition to gaining access to justice. 135 They will no longer have
to focus on minimizing the risk of maximal loss (rather than
maximizing the chance of gains). To the extent that a funder
has informal ties with institutional incumbents, the individual
defendants will now be able to reap the benefits.13 6 And, the individual plaintiff will now have the resources to engage in signaling to its opponents, including by transmitting promises,
threats, and bluffs, all of which enhance her bargaining position. 13 7 In fact, an institutional commercial funder's willingness
to fund a lawsuit, if known to the opposing party, may itself
function as a signal to the opposing party regarding the
strength of the claim. 38 Such a signal can strengthen the
funded party's bargaining position and enhance the chances of
an early and high settlement. This, in turn, may create positive
externalities as cases get settled and taken off courts' dockets
early.
Classes, already modified one-shotters by virtue of their alliance with plaintiffs' firms, will continue reaping the rewards
of increased access to justice, economies of scale, advanced intelligence, and expertise. 139 They also will continue trading
135. Individuals, sovereigns from the developing world, and some classesespecially in very complex and therefore very expensive cases that the Plaintiffs' Bar cannot absorb-will gain the largest increase in access to justice. For
a discussion of the ability to fund very large and complex cases being capped,
see Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: Contingency and Its
Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 468 (1998).
136. See Galanter, supra note 6, at 98-99 (explaining the potential benefits
of association with institutional incumbents).
137. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 8, at 972-73.
138. Id. (explaining the forms of transmission of information in litigation
and negotiation). See generally CAMERER, supra note 8 (outlining facets of
strategic interaction between parties in various circumstances).
139. See Galanter, supra note 6, at 98-99 (describing the advantages in intelligence, specialization, and expertise that repeat players have over individual plaintiffs).
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those off for diminished control and sharing the interest in rule
change with that of a funder (now an investment firm rather
than, or in addition to, a plaintiff's firm). 140 The two biggest
changes third-party funding-as opposed to attorney fundingintroduces into the class action context are the effects of secondary markets in legal claims, 14 1 and that classes may now
find themselves up against funded defendants (i.e., defendants
that have transferred the risk of litigation but also some of
their control over settlement and their ability to play for
rules). 142
Courts and regulators also should consider a conceptual
difference between attorney funding and third-party funding.
While third-party funders may reap outsized rewards on their
investments-up to fifty percent of very large judgmentsthese cannot be viewed, from a moral standpoint, as windfall
fees as they are viewed in the attorney-funding context. Attorneys provide legal services for their fees whereas investors invest. The intuition underlying the lodestar standard, according
to which a law firm's return should be a function of the time
spent on the case, 143 does not have an equivalent in the pure
investment realm where returns on an investment are not
capped per se.
Sovereigns, like individuals, have low rates of play repetition.144 They are therefore less likely to play for rules.145 How140. The Australian experience shows that investment firms do not necessarily compete with the Plaintiffs' Bar. Rather, investors tend to fund litigation through established plaintiffs' firms. This causes a repeat play amongst
funders and attorneys that then further complicates the client's bargaining
position within the triangular relationship. Interview with Anonymous, Exec.,
Undisclosed Inv. Firm (Nov. 2009).
141. See infra Part III.C.1.
142.

See infra Part III.B.2.

143. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp. established the lodestar standard courts use to assess the reasonability
of attorneys' fees in class actions and bankruptcy cases. 487 F.2d 161, 166-69
(3d Cir. 1973), vacated, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976). It consists of multiplying
counsel's reasonable hours by a reasonable hourly rate, which is then adjusted
by several factors. Id.
144. The outlier example is Argentina, which has been a party to far more
arbitrations than any other state, acting as the respondent in forty-six investment arbitrations in the wake of its economic financial crisis in the early
2000s. See Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDIFlows: An
Overview, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, at

xxxviii-xxxix (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). More representative are the following examples in the international investment arbitration
context: Mexico is a far second to Argentina, having been a respondent in eleven cases, and all but six other countries have been party to three or fewer dis-
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ever, like repeat players, they may exhibit strategic behaviorlike settlement avoidance even with "bad" fact patterns and
vice versa-due to considerations other than a pure cost/benefit
analysis of a single arbitration. 146 Therefore, sovereigns can be
considered modified repeat players. With the exception of the
most developed nations sovereigns do not have in-house expertise in international arbitration and, therefore, they may or
may not be sophisticated players. 147 In many cases, a single arbitration is likely to be very high-stakes (i.e., too large to manage routinely and rationally). 148 But sovereigns are not similar
to individuals in all ways. They may have and use extra-legal
negotiating leverage-such as the power to expropriate, regulate, withdraw from the treaty regime underlying the arbitration body, use diplomacy, or resort to arms. 149 Sovereigns are
putes. See Clint Peinhardt & Todd Allee, The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes: A Multilateral Organization Enhancing a Bilateral Treaty Regime 3-4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association), available
at http://www.utdallas.edul-cwpO52000/mpsa.peinhardt-allee.pdf.
145. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing rule
change as it relates to one-shotters and repeat players).
146. See id.
147. In reality, first-world sovereigns and third-world sovereigns deserve
separate treatment. First-world sovereigns are often more sophisticated, have
more access and capacity to use in-house and outside expertise, are more likely to play for rules and, critically, can structure transactions in advance based
on their knowledge of the arbitration game. However, for the sake of simplicity, I group both types of sovereigns together for the purposes of the analysis
herein and leave the task of further discussion of the disparate impact of arbitration financing on these two types of sovereigns and of litigation funding of
international arbitration and adjudication to a separate article.
148. There are many examples of the very high stakes in international arbitration and adjudication. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
136, 137-39 (July 9) (addressing the legality of the security wall constructed
by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory); Gov't of Sudan v. Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration), Final Award, TT 2845 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/
Abyei Final Award.pdf (arbitrating a boundary-straddling territory rich in
natural resources that was funded by donor governments' donations via the
Financial Assistance Fund of the Permanent Court of Arbitration); Appellate
Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, TT 1-9,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) (arbitrating the United States' practice of subsidizing cotton farmers in the context of a highly politicized challenge by Brazil which may influence an entire section of the domestic economy).
149. For example, discontented with the outcome of investment arbitrations it was involved in, Bolivia withdrew from the ICSID regime. Press Release,
Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under
Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), available at http://icsid
.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/Announcement3.htm. Bolivia also attempted
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relatively likely to have the advantage of the possessor of the
good in question. And, like other repeat players, they may have
domestic and international public opinion considerations since
they are accountable to their constituencies and susceptible to
international pressures.
As in the cases of individual plaintiffs and very large class
actions, sovereigns in the developing world stand to gain very
significant increases in access to justice through litigation funding. Currently, most financing of sovereign claims or defenses
is in the context of international commercial and investment
arbitration. Sovereigns may choose to use such funding to enforce their rights under cross-border contracts to which they
are a party. 150 Other than the lack of funds or an inability to
justify to their impoverished constituencies spending high-end
Western rates on lawyers from the developing world, the greatest challenge facing governments in the developing world is a
lack of capacity. 15 1 This is both a lack of capacity among local
lawyers to carry on the kind of specialized litigation that takes
place in international arbitrations, and a lack of capacity to
reach out to, vet, and retain Western lawyers who possess such
specialized skills. 152 Litigation funding, especially by funds speto convince other Latin American countries to join in denunciating the ICSID
Convention. See CHRISTIAN TIETJE ET AL., ONCE AND FOREVER? THE LEGAL
EFFECTS OF A DENUNCIATION OF ICSID 5-7 (2008), available at http://www

.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/Heft74.pdf (providing background on Bolivia's
statements and actions). Bolivia was followed by Ecuador, who also withdrew
from ICSID. Press Release, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Ecuador's Notification Under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention (Dec. 5, 2007),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/Announcement9.html;
see also Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Law and Politicsof EngagingResistance in
Investment Dispute Settlement, 26 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 251, 252-58 (2007)
(noting the range of extra-legal considerations, including colonial-era gunboat
threats and the ever-present influence of politics).
150. For example, some governments in the developing world may have
claims against pharmaceutical companies for IP rights in, and royalties from,
commercial medicines developed from research in that country, extractive industries for rents and royalties, and for breach of infrastructure development
contracts. Interview with Anonymous, Legal Advisor, Gov'ts in the Developing
World (Feb. 2010). Here, in particular, the entrepreneurial model, wherein
funders seek out potential cases, may provide a useful tool to governments in
the developing world that may not have the capacity to identify and pursue
their claims. Id.
151. See Steinitz, supra note 21, at 237 n.113 ("[O]ften there is a vast capacity gap between the attorneys and their clients.").
152. See id. at 210-22, 224-26 (discussing the capacity challenges, the relationship between Western lawyers and developing sovereigns, and the professional responsibility deficit in cross-border litigation). See generally YVES
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE (1996) (discussing the hy-
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cializing in international arbitrations, may be able to bridge
these gaps. Similarly, international arbitration is characterized
by the very small number of private institutions that administer the vast majority of arbitrations. 15 3 Funders are therefore
likely to create informal ties with these institutions from which
their clients may benefit. Given the highly centralized and exclusive nature of the International Arbitration Bar, agency
problems between the client, on the one hand, and the funders
and attorney, on the other, may pose particular challenges as
the funder-attorney relationships are likely to often become a
repeat-play relationship.
In addition, a particular challenge posed by this type of
litigant is that sovereigns, at least according to liberaldemocratic conceptions of government, represent their citizenry. One implication is that the subject matters of the disputes
they are involved in may be ones in which the public interest is
heightened. For example, they may involve: natural resources,
future generation funds, national boundaries, the legality of
domestic trade, investment, environmental policies and regulations; and national security. 154 These are also subject matters
in which a single case, such as one on the legality of domestic
regulation of foreign investments under international investment treaties, may affect rule change. Whether the sovereign
in question is litigating a pure commercial dispute or a public
law dispute, transparency is an issue; both international commercial arbitration and public international law arbitration are
notorious for their lack of transparency. 155 In comparison, sovereigns involved in cross-border (or domestic) litigation, as opposed to international arbitration, may present somewhat less
per-specialization in international arbitration; the monopoly of Western, especially Anglo-American, lawyers over the practice; and the highly exclusive nature of the international arbitration bar).
153. See Loukas Mistelis & Crina Baltag, Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards and Settlement in InternationalArbitration: CorporateAttitudes and Practices, 19 AM. REV. INTL ARB. 319, 356-57 (2008).
154. See supra note 148.
155. All commercial international arbitration is, by definition, confidential.
See, e.g., INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION, app. II,
art. I, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4093/index.html
(indicating that sessions and documents relating to cases are confidential). Investment arbitrations are slightly more transparent. See INT'L CENTRE FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES,

art. 48, cl. 5 ("The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of
the parties.").
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of a public policy challenge since proceedings are public. In
sum, investing in public international arbitrations, commercial
international arbitrations, and cross-border litigation may each
call for different analyses by arbitrators and judges requested
to rule on disputes emanating from funding arrangements, as
well as by regulators and the parties themselves.15 6 All three
differ from domestic litigation as discussed above.
As the foregoing paragraphs demonstrate, the potential for
increased one-shotters and modified one-shotters influence on
rule change offered by litigation finance is manifold. First, litigation finance can afford one-shotters and modified oneshotters the ability to overcome litigation fatigue-among other
benefits of repeat play-which are necessary (though not sufficient) conditions to play for rules. In situations where a single
case can change rules for the modified one-shotter (e.g., some
international arbitrations), the newfound ability to play for rule
change due to the mere introduction of litigation finance is obvious.
More generally, however, litigation offers many instances
where rule change is achieved even if settlement occurs because rule change can occur during pretrialproceedings such as
motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and appeals from interim decisions. Such pretrial stages can be expensive to pursue. A one-shotter may therefore either settle
prior to exhausting such steps or proceed to trial without the
strategic advantages that pursuing them may provide. Thus,
even a tendency to settle does not necessarily preclude rule
change.
2.

Corporate Defendants as Modified Repeat Players
One must consider how defendants'-in addition to plaintiffs'-positions, in particular ability to play for rules, may
change. Corporate defense is the only form of defense-side funding currently contemplated by the litigation-funding indus-

156. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic raised a similar issue to the
claim transfer in a funded international arbitration. ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/5, Award (Apr. 15, 2009). In Phoenix, the arbitrators were called on to
decide the significance of the fact that the ownership over all the assets of a
company was transferred to another. Id. T 143-44. This shell company was
formed in another country for the sole purpose of enabling the new entity to
have standing to initiate a claim on behalf of the original company, and to do
so under the ICSID Convention and ICSID jurisdiction. Id. The arbitrators
ruled that the attempt was an abuse of process. Id.
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try.157 Defense funding is the functional equivalent of after-theevent insurance since it takes the form of allowing a company
to pay the expected value of a lawsuit plus a premium to protect it against a higher-than-expected loss. Litigation finance
therefore addresses a market failure: "Insurance companies do
not sell after-the-event insurance policies for lawsuits that already have been filed and there isn't a market in which litigants can trade away litigation risk."158 Such "insurance" allows companies to (1) hedge against the loss involved in an
unfavorable award; (2) minimize and, just as importantly, predict litigation costs; and therefore (3) eliminate the effects that
having uncertain litigation on the company's books has on its
ability to engage in major transactions. 1 59
From a bargaining perspective, such "after-the-event insurance" can transform corporate defendants, the paradigmatic
repeat players, into modified repeat players as they transfer
the defense of their litigations to funders. While still enjoying
economies of scale, advanced intelligence, the ability to structure the next transaction, and access to specialists, these corporations have diminished control over litigation and settlement.
Their abilities to strategically transmit information, to control
their bargaining reputation, to maximize gain over long series
of cases and, importantly, to play for rule change are diminished as some of that control is ceded to funders whose interests may diverge from that of the corporate defendant. In other
words, the social function of litigation changes structurally via
litigation funding not only by increasing one-shotter plaintiffs'
ability to affect rule change via the courts but also by corporate
defendants' diminished ability to do so. 160
157. See Molot, supra note 7, at 376-77 (stating that "[o]utside this context
... transaction costs and adverse-selection problems are likely to loom too
large" for defense-side risk transfer).
158. Id. at 367. Because the event has already occurred, the primary costthe underlying harm-is not transferred. It is the cost of litigation that is
transferred, as well as the risk of a larger-than-expected award. See id. at 371
(illustrating the broad range of costs a party could potentially face).
159. See id. at 374-75 ("[T]he uncertainty surrounding a significant potential liability may increase a company's cost of capital by depressing its stock
price or increasing the interest rate it must pay on its debt. Where litigation risk
interferes with an equity investment, a debt refinancing, or a merger or acquisition, the tertiary costs of litigation can dwarf the primary costs. In those instances, a system of risk pooling would do more to reduce the costs of litigation
than radicalproceduralreform ever could hope to achieve." (emphasis added)).
160. Though there is no symmetry here, a corporation still has the wherewithal to retain the litigation as it always has if it chooses to retain the ability
to play for rules. For one-shotters, on the other hand, third-party finance-
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However, corporate-defense transfer and its effects on corporate bargaining power have social drawbacks. Perhaps the
most significant social drawback is the moral hazard created in
the form of diminished deterrence and lessened incentives to
avoid harmful activities and prevent harm. In addition, depending on how the risk transfer is structured and how much of
it the corporate defendant retains, the corporate defendant
would have less of an incentive to participate in a vigorous defense of its case. 16 1 This moral hazard would be transferred
onto the funder's own investors if and when legal claims and
defenses are securitized. Lastly, any redistributive advantages
that may be achieved by transferring funds from corporate defendants to other social actors via punitively high jury awards
is eliminated when corporate defendants can transfer litigation
risk. 162 Thus, litigation financing affords quasi-immunity to
corporations as the threat of large-scale litigation is thereby
diminished. One implication is that legislatures and judges
may wish to treat corporate-defense transfer differently depending on the areas of law (e.g., by allowing transfers for
business disputes but not for environmental or human rights
disputes) in order to avoid such quasi-immunity.
3. Funders' Incentives to Play for Rules
As discussed, an unexamined question is the effect thirdparty funding may have on categories of litigants' ability to
play for rules. While rule change is a public good, it may be
profitable for litigation funders to invest in rule change. This is
because they manage a portfolio of litigation and, in particular,
because they invest repeatedly and sequentially in certain categories of cases (e.g., international arbitration or intellectual
property). 163 This may initially seem counterintuitive because
of the similarities between third-party funding and attorney
funding-particularly, in terms of agency problems. Many of
with its diminished control-may be the only option for seeking any form of
redress. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. However, the value of any
given defense for rule change may only come to light after control over it has
been transferred to the funder, because the potential for rule change has become apparent from facts revealed in the discovery process or because the law
has changed post-transfer.
161. See Molot, supra note 7, at 376-77.
162. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667,
667-69 (1994) (explaining how litigation and taxes can function as substitute
mechanisms for redistribution).
163. See supra note 94.
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the agency problems that one might expect to emerge with the
introduction of third-party funding have been discussed extensively in the context of the attorney-client relationship in contingency cases. 164 Chief among the oft-cited concerns in the contingency context are conflicts of interest between attorneys and
clients. The argument is that attorneys (and funders) have an
incentive to settle early for a relatively low, but certain, recovery rather than incur the costs of going to trial and risking no
or lesser recovery. In addition, attorneys (and funders) have an
incentive to underinvest in a given representation as there are
diminishing returns in additional time investment beyond a
certain point. 165 Both problems are exacerbated by the fact that
contingency lawyers (and funders) make decisions across a
portfolio of cases-trading off a small gain in one case for a
larger gain in another case achieved with the same timeinvestment and reputational costs. 16 6 When the contingency fee
is applied in the class action context, perhaps the most important context in which it operates and a key area of potential investment for litigation-finance firms, additional problems arise.
These include increased agency costs-including bonding, monitoring, and residual costs-which permit opportunistic behavior by attorneys, asymmetric stakes due to the fact that defendants' lawyers stand to lose more than do plaintiffs' lawyers, and
cost differentials which tend to encourage strike suits. 16 7
164. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, JudicialReview of
Class Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 193 (2009) (remarking that

the interests of the client and attorney are unlikely to be aligned in these cases).
165. Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
503, 510 (1996) (acknowledging the diminishing returns).
166. Arguably, early settlement, which is likely to be the outcome in the
majority of funded cases, creates a positive externality. "From the social
... perspective the savings from settlement are larger than the sum of the
parties' cost savings because society also avoids incurring the court's expenses." Shavell, The FundamentalDivergence, supra note 8, at 602. Similarly, contingency fees not only create an incentive for the lawyer to underinvest
but also for the client to demand overinvestment (i.e., to demand measures the
client would not have been willing to pay for had the cost of litigation not been
shifted). See Hay, supra note 165, at 508-11 (discussing the incentive to underinvest). For other agency problems in the contingent-fee context, see generally id., and Macey & Miller, supra note 164 (discussing agency problems in settlement negotiations). Contingent fee legal practice is sometimes likened to
portfolio management. See KRITZER, supra note 88, at 10-11. Modern portfolio
theory argues that investors should balance and maximize an expected return
and uncertainty of a combination of investments (i.e., mitigate avoidable risks
though portfolio diversification). See generally HARRY MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO
SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959).

167.

See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation:
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But the portfolio heuristic can shed new light on the common critique regarding the incentive to settle early. As managers of a portfolio, contingency-fee lawyers and funders can afford to take on the risk of losing a given case while the
individual plaintiff can hold out for a better settlement or an
adjudicated outcome. 168 Whereas the client might be reluctant
to proceed if required to bear all the costs of uncertainty, the
lawyer is less concerned about the loss in any individual case
and more concerned about outcomes across a portfolio of cases. 169 This insight is important to the argument that litigation
financiers may value precedent, and therefore play for rules, in
a few important cases.
A more general application of the portfolio heuristic to attorneys' contingency practice, and by extension to funders, reveals that going to trial rather than settling (and settling late
rather than early) may be strategic for the portfolio owner and
manager for a number of reasons. First, going to trial generally
may be advantageous, especially for new funders, in order to
develop skills (such as highly specialized investment arbitration skills) and subject-matter expertise. These skills and expertise will allow such funders to be more efficient in the future
in their case selection, pretrial strategy, and settlement negotiations. 170
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 882-83 (1987) (defining agency costs as "the costs of monitoring the
agent," in this case, the lawyer; bonding costs as "the costs the agent incurs to
advertise or guarantee [the principal's] fidelity"; and residual costs as "the cost
of opportunistic behavior that is not cost-efficient to prevent").
168.

KRITZER, supra note 88, at 16.

169. Id. at 15. Kritzer notes, based on surveys and interviews, that contingency lawyers are rarely conscious of the applicability of portfolio theory to
their practice management. Id. at 12-13. However, even a cursory study of
professional litigation-finance firms' disclosures shows that they do, indeed,
consciously manage their litigations as a portfolio in the strict sense of the
word. See, e.g., Press Release, Burford Capital, supra note 19 ("Burford believes
that investing in commercial disputes must be conducted, and evaluated, on a
portfolio basis instead of focusing on the performance or results of individual
cases."). The application of portfolio management principles to litigation financiers' case management strategies therefore applies to them a fortiori.
170. See Marc Galanter, Case Congregationsand Their Careers, 24 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 371, 372 (1990) (discussing "case congregations"-sets of substantively related cases that create incentives for attorneys to invest heavily in
early cases to facilitate later cases because cases may be substantively similar,
and because lawyers can use what they learn in handling earlier cases to their
advantage in later cases); see also KRITZER, supra note 88, at 13-14 ("The [key
to a portfolio perspective is] the need to understand the relationship among
cases in the portfolio; in portfolio theory this is the issue of 'correlation.'
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Second, going to trial generally may be advantageous, especially for new funders, in order to develop a reputation for a
willingness to go to trial and for an ability to win trials. 171 This
reputation will allow them both to be competitive in attracting
clients (reduce bonding costs) and effective in eliciting early
and high settlements in later cases. 172 In such cases, where
funders (lawyers or financiers) go to trial for reasons other than
rule change, any incidental rule change may be a by-productan externality-of the process through which funders train
themselves, position themselves, and market themselves.
But, thirdly, going to trial specifically in order to obtain
rule change may be strategic for litigation funders (lawyers or
financiers) because the value of precedent is greater for them
than it is for their one-shotter clients. Economists have argued
that
when neither party is interested in precedent, there is no incentive to
litigate, and hence no pressure on the law to change. When only one
party is interested in precedent, that party will litigate until a favorable decision is obtained; the law in such cases will favor parties with
such an ongoing interest.173

Moreover, the law will come to favor the more concentrated and
coordinated parties with such an ongoing interest in the law.
Plaintiffs' attorneys, in particular, are such a group. For example, "the major group with an interest in changing tort law is
tort lawyers." 174 Tort law has therefore been influenced by the
... [One] way cases may be related is reputationally. That is, [a funder] may
rely upon a reputation developed in one case to create expectations on the part
of the defendant. The reputation may concern any of a variety of things. The
[funder] may be known as someone who is a hard bargainer. The [funder] may
be known for thoroughly preparing cases. The [funder] may be regarded as
someone who is very selective in the cases accepted for representation.
... Reputation is important for a second reason as well.... [A funder's] reputation is central for attracting clients, either directly or through referrals.
Thus, a [funder] may choose to do something in a particular case, such as go to
trial, if the [funder] believes such an action will enhance his or her reputation
in a way that will attract future clients. Alternatively, a [funder] might accept
work that is not highly remunerative, but that attracts substantial publicity
... for the reputational gains . . . .").

171. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
173. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, supra note 8, at 61 (emphasis added).
174. Rubin & Bailey, The Role of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 808 ("[W]e have
discussed only tort law. However, as we indicate below, the same types of
changes that occurred in tort law were also occurring in other branches of
law."). Rubin and Bailey's empirical data is both statistical and anecdotal. Id.
at 817-21. For example, they report that:
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ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to organize and "by the interest of
lawyers in the future value of precedents."175 For this reason, it
will sometimes be in the interests of plaintiffs and their attorneys to litigate rather than settle a case in order to obtain a
change in precedent. For example, tort lawyers internalize
much of the value of a rule of strict liability. Other examples of
rules that can benefit litigation funders and their clients are
those that create a special incentive to sue-rules regarding
damage enhancement, fee shifting, and simplified or lowered
pleading requirements.17 6 This distinguishes plaintiffs' attorneys from defense attorneys:
Plaintiffs' attorneys are potentially interested in all products. In a
given case, a defendant's attorney is interested in only one product
and its history. Therefore, win or lose, the plaintiff's attorney is much
more interested in the stated grounds of the decision than is the defendant. As long as the defendant wins, he does not care if the plaintiff obtains an opinion that greatly benefits other plaintiffs so long as
it absolves the particular defendant. The plaintiff will fight very hard
for such a decision, while the defendant will not resist much. Conversely, if the defendant loses, he does not care much if the rule is
broad or narrow, but the plaintiff cares very much. 177

Therefore, investing in precedent is similar to investing in
rule change via lobbying (and campaign contributions), a welldocumented practice engaged in by the Plaintiffs' Bar. 178 "Many
trade associations, for example, have litigating arms as well as
lobbying arms and sometimes use these to achieve legal change
benefiting members."179 Further, investors' concentration in a
In at least one case, a group of lawyers has taken a case for no charge
in order to change the governing precedents. While the lawyers justified this as a public service, the case presented an opportunity for the
lawyers to challenge limits that the state Legislature had placed on
damage awards.
Id. at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, Rubin, Why Is the
Common Law Efficient?, supra note 8, at 52 ("The particular example [of accident liability] does not matter, for, as Posner has shown, torts, property, and
contract law can all be analyzed within the same framework." (citing RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98-102 (1972))).
175. Rubin & Bailey, The Role of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 808 (emphasis
added).
176. For a discussion of special incentives to sue and rule changes that attempt to strengthen private enforcement, see generally Margaret H. Lemos,
Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782 (2011).
177. Rubin & Bailey, The Role of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 810.
178. See, e.g., Rita Jameson, ATLA, TRIAL, July 1980, at 56, 59.
179. Bailey & Rubin, Legal Change, supra note 8, at 474. For example, the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America "has also lobbied for or against federal
legislation which might affect an injured party's receiving adequate awards
.... Adequate representation of its viewpoints before Congress was one of the
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limited number of legal subject matters is a form of specialization that may allow them to enhance the value of their portfolios rather than diminish it on account of a lack of diversification. Thus, the fact that litigation-finance firms' portfolios
appear, at first blush, to be invested in correlated risk may not
pose a problem.
There is another reason why concentration along a very
limited range of legal areas may not undermine the diversification rationale of portfolio management and why, consequently,
investing in rule change may be valuable for financiers. Litigation-investment firms diversify along procedural characteristics
of cases rather than subject matters. For example:
Burford Capitals strategy is to create and manage a portfolio of
commercial dispute financing investments diversified by duration,
claim type, geography and a number of other variables, with the aim
of providing shareholders with attractive levels of dividends and capital growth. The Company expects returns to be uncorrelated to general equity market performance.180

Other variables include the presence/absence of a jury, the particular judge, and the phase of the litigation (first instance or
appeal).
In sum, while rule change is a public good and therefore
the notion of commercial investors who are interested in profit
maximization investing in it may seem counterintuitive, the
argument advanced herein is that in certain circumstances, it
is strategic for financiers to play for rules and that the public
good of rule change is an externality of such strategic play. 181
key reasons behind the association's decision in 1977 to move its headquarters
to Washington, DC." Jameson, supra note 178, at 59.
180. Press Release, Burford Capital, supra note 19 (emphasis added); see
also id. ("In the short term, the Company's focus is on commercial disputes in
the United States and on international arbitration matters; in the medium
term, the Company may expand its focus to other attractive and suitable jurisdictions.").
181. This is similar to Shavell's point that the level of litigation is socially
inadequate because litigants do not factor in the value of deterrence when they
make their litigation decisions. Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence, supra
note 8, at 609-10. His more general insight is that the general level of litigation is not optimal, but rather that the privately determined level of litigation
can be either socially excessive or inadequate because of the fundamental differences between private and social incentives to use the legal system. Id. at
608-11. The divergence is attributable to two externalities. Id. at 611. First,
when a party makes a litigation decision, it does not take into account the legal costs that it induces others to incur. The other externality is that the party
does not recognize associated effects on deterrence and certain other social
benefits. Id. It is argued herein that rule change/clarification is also a social
benefit that parties do not factor in, which, in turn, may lead to a suboptimal
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The claim, in other words, is a weak one. In a small yet socially
significant number of cases, litigation funders will likely play
for rules in order to maximize the future value of their (subjectmatter-concentrated) portfolios. It is not a strong claim that investors will philanthropically or ideologically seek to advance
the law via litigation as do nonprofit impact-litigation
groups. 182
The foregoing sections demonstrate how litigation funding
can change the bargaining dynamics between types of litigating
parties for the better. The following sections identify how this
potential may be undercut by agency problems created by secondary markets in legal claims and the fragmentation of the attorney-client-funder relationship.
C. AGENCY PROBLEMS

1. Bargaining in the Shadow of Financing: The Effects of
Secondary Markets in Legal Claims
Using the taxonomy as a prism highlights that different
types of litigation funders may have different effects on bargaining dynamics between parties and, consequently, on different types of litigants' ability to play for rules. This is perhaps
nowhere more stark than in relation to institutional investors.
Unlike any of the other types of funders (plaintiffs' firms, with
level of trials. Litigation expenditures, according to Shavell, are subject to the
same general divergence between private and social incentives so they may be
in principle either socially excessive or socially inadequate. Id. at 610-11.
182. John Coffee recently suggested that nonprofit groups in Europe should
join forces with litigation funders. Coffee, supra note 7, at 348-49. If this happens, financiers' role in rule change may become even stronger, though they
will still be motivated by profit. Note, moreover, that it is not herein argued
that financiers already do play for rules. The industry in the United States is
young and too small to have established a track record of this sort. Rather, it
is argued that this is a likely externality that will be created by this industry
as it expands and matures. Additionally, this Article contends that funders
that develop the reputation for playing for rules may gain a strategic advantage: opposing parties may have to factor into settlement offers the price that
precedent creation/change may have on the funders on a portfolio basis. Finally, despite the aforesaid comments regarding the competitive bargaining advantage that may accrue to a litigation-finance firm that may deliberately play
for rules, it is not necessary for the validity of the argument advanced herein
that funders be deliberate and conscious of their social role in legal change.
Rubin, for example, notes that "cases are more likely to be litigated and legal
change is more likely to occur if parties with the stronger interest in a rule are
disadvantaged by the current rule. This tendency towards change occurs as a
natural result of the litigationprocess, with no requirement for conscious decisions." Bailey & Rubin, Legal Change, supra note 8, at 474 (emphasis added).
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which they are conflated, and commercial funders, the original
targets of the champerty doctrine), institutional investors may
sell their investments in secondary markets. They may do so
directly by bundling and securitizing legal claims or indirectly
by selling shares in the investment firm itself. Parties thus
may find themselves bargaining in the shadow of financing. 183
Secondary markets in legal claims have benefits. They can
increase liquidity, lower the risk for funders, and lower the cost
of finance for clients. Bargaining in the shadow of financing
may also increase efficiency; institutional investors are in the
process of developing due diligence protocols, standards, and
statistics to assist in evaluating individual claims and making
investment decisions across portfolios of cases.
But the shadow of financing further may alter bargaining
dynamics by introducing additional agency problems and externalities. First, regulators, judges, and parties should consider the effects of indirect trading-trading in shares of public litigation investment firms. Perhaps the biggest risk this form of
trading poses is that funders have fiduciary duties to the
shareholders and not to clients. Unlike attorneys, who do have
such duties towards the clients, funders only have contractual
obligations. Therefore, a publicly traded funder must prioritize
the interests of shareholders. That is, a funder must settle early for a low amount in order to realize shareholder gains in a
given quarter rather than pursue a suit that is beneficial for
the client but detrimental to shareholders. This conflict of interest may lead funders to pressure a client to settle early. An
additional complication created by this form of trading is that it
imposes disclosure duties on the funder. These duties could
conflict with the desire of a party to keep certain strategic information confidential and could further undermine attorneyclient privilege. 184
Second, one should consider the effects of direct tradingthe prospect of trading in legal-claims-backed securities. This
practice is not yet in existence but, as discussed above, precur183. Cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 8, at 950 (coining the phrase
"bargaining in the shadow of the law" to refer to negotiations that happen outside of the courtroom).
184. See, e.g., Binham, supra note 41 ("Juridica will target commercial litigations and international arbitrations for investment. But international arbitration is notoriously secretive: how to square that with AIM's [a London stock
exchange] disclosure rules? For that reason Travers Smith head of corporate
finance Spencer Summerfield, who led the advice to the company on its float,
admitted that Juridica's 'was the hardest IPO I've ever had to do."').
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sors of such a practice already exist. In addition, given the significant difficulty of valuing any individual claim (i.e., the potential recovery in any given litigation), institutional investment in litigation finance may only be viable if those financing
it can put together a large and diverse enough pool of cases-a
portfolio.1 85 Once assets are pooled, securitizing and selling
them off is a logical next step to consider.
Trading in legal-claims-backed securities can create moral
hazards relating to both the funder-client relationship and the
funder-investor relationships. On the funder-client side, in certain subject matters of litigation (e.g., a pure business dispute)
the original owners of the litigation, unlike owners of homes or
cars, may have a diminished interest in the asset underlying
the security and a diminished incentive to prosecute their
claims or defenses once the litigation ceases to be expensive
and uncertain for them.
On the funder-investor side, as legal claims are commodified and ownership in them becomes freely transferable as part
of an originate-and-distribute model, 186 there is a risk of an asset bubble of the kind recently witnessed with novel assets like
subprime mortgages. 187 Such a bubble may form in a legal185. See KRITZER, supra note 88, at 10-16 (explaining Kritzer's application
of portfolio theory to contingency fee firms). While securitization is probably
not imminent in the current market, which is suffering from a rare lack of liquidity and where the rating agencies are unlikely to want to rate novel, hardto-price securities, the difficulties valuating legal-claims-backed securities do
not seem without parallel or insurmountable in the long run. On the current
crisis in structured finance, and in particular on the breakdown of the rating
agencies' credibility, see generally Enhancing Investor Protectionand the Regulation of SecuritiesMarkets: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.,
and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 64 (2009) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.)
[hereinafter Hearing]. The difficulties in valuing legal claims and defenses
render them an asset more similar to diamonds and art than to houses and cars.
Nevertheless, it is asset classes of the former kind that some investors are
showing an interest in because of, not despite of, the recent financial crisis. See
William MacNamara, Moves to Mine Gem Potential,FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/b29fa9f4-d608-1lde-b8Of-00144feabdcO
.html (discussing a recent, posterisis push to create a diamond investment
market in light of investors' recent interest in alternative asset classes, despite the lack of transparency and liquidity in the diamond market, and the
fact that diamonds are "terrifically difficult to value"). As Victor Goldberg
pointed out to me, litigation as an asset class is similar to investing in start-up
companies and films because the asset's value depends on the effort the original owner makes after the investment has been made.
186. For a discussion of the originate-and-distribute model, its risks, and
ways to curtail those risks, see generally Hearing,supra note 185, at 53.
187. See id.
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claims market since the clients and the originators, or funders,
will externalize the risks of faulty due diligence, poor legal
judgment, or unzealous representation onto those holding the
securities. As the recent financial crisis has demonstrated,
when converging with other forms of risky securities, this can
have deleterious effects on the economy as a whole. 188 A bubble
in the market for legal claims is also one scenario that does
raise a significant risk of nonmeritorious claims flooding the
courts-yet another externality on society as a whole. Moreover, trading in legal-claims-backed securities may add an additional layer of disclosure requirements on the funding firms,
worsening the complications such requirements create for the
client's bargaining power, as discussed above.
Plaintiffs' diminished control over their settlement negotiations, which may be exacerbated by secondary trading, and the
obligation to maximize the bottom line for shareholders reveal
another problem with litigation funding and claim transfer: the
problem of commodifying legal claims. If legal claims are
bought and sold, they become a pure commodity. As such, they
simply are assigned a dollar value, have no other intrinsic value, and theoretically can be exchanged for any similarly valued
commodity. While the literature is largely silent on why trading in legal claims is "distasteful,"18 9 the underlying sentiment
may be resistance to the reduction of legal claims, particularly
of nonbusiness legal claims, into a mere commodity. 190
Indeed, a unique, possibly socially undesirable, element to
the commodification of legal claims is purely to monetize all legal recovery, thereby dramatically affecting choice of remedies.
Nonmonetary remedies, such as injunctions, declaratory relief,
and specific performance, become unattractive either because a
plaintiff has lost interest or because the funder pressures for a
simple monetary award instead of a socially desirable remedy
such as injunction or clean-up. By acknowledging that the effects of litigation funding are different in different areas of law,
the taxonomy allows for a nuanced consideration of the effects
of commodification in different possible scenarios. Legislatures
and courts should decide which litigation subject matters
188. See Dowd, supra note 98, at 142-44.
189. Herman, supra note 18 ("Detractors [of third party litigation funding]
base their suspicion on . . . that there is something distasteful, some say unethical, about a third-party that has no involvement in a legal dispute being
allowed to profit from it."); see also WAYE, supranote 7, at 48.
190. WAYE, supra note 7, at 48.

HeinOnline -- 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1321 2010-2011

1322

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1268

should, as a matter of public policy, be subject to commodification and which should not.
U.S. tort law provides an example of the difficulty commodification poses. The United States allows the award of punitive
damages-a quasi-criminal sanction-for certain torts. 19 1 This
is a manifestation of the public interest in prosecuting such
claims to deter socially undesirable behaviors and economic activities such as pollution or the knowing distribution of damaged or hazardous goods. Conversely, in personal injury cases,
we as a society have long accepted the notion of placing a dollar
value on the economic aspect of bodily harm. 192 Securities class
actions are similarly straightforward in that the dollar value
lost to the investor is the primary underlying harm. 193 But
more complex are antitrust class actions where the public has
an interest in preventing anticompetitive behavior.
To further complicate matters, certain areas of law involve
bundled interests, both monetary and nonmonetary, underlying
large and complex legal claims. The solution, therefore, lies in
courts unbundling the underlying interests and ensuring noncommodification of the underlying interests that as a society we
wish not to commoditize. This can be done, as discussed in the
next Part, by requiring court supervision or other safety measures be implemented in the settlement stage. It may also require, as discussed below, imposing certain fiduciary duties on
the funder. Of course, this may mean that a plaintiff who seeks
both monetary and nonmonetary remedies may have to allow
for a larger percentage of the monetary recovery to be paid to
the funder than would otherwise be the case.
A second problem, which may offset the potential positive
effects of litigation finance, is the fragmentation of the triangular attorney-client-funder relationship. The relationship may
break into two, or even three, separate relationships between
attorney and client, funder and client, and in some cases attorney and funder. The next section will consider this issue.

191. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT 488 (2005) (explaining the uniquely American remedy of
punitive damages for torts).
192. See Alexandra Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 83, 146-47 (2007).
193. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71,
81 (2006) (explaining that "private securities litigation was 'an indispensable
tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses"' (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 104-369, at 26 (1995) (Conf. Rep.))).
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2. The Fragmentation of the Attorney-Client-Funder
Relationship
The complexity of the client-funder relationship has been
the focus of much of the discussion of litigation funding. 194 For
example, commentators have noted that the introduction of a
funder into the equation complicates a client's ability to communicate with her attorney and may diminish the attorney's
ability to exercise professional judgment. The fragmentation of
the attorney-client-funder relationship 95 also stands to dilute
the potential equalizing effects that litigation funding might
have as amongst the litigating parties and therefore on oneshotters' and modified one-shotters' ability to affect rule
change.
First and foremost is the question of client control and its
effects on rule change. Beyond paying a monetary price, financed clients, especially one-shotters and modified oneshotters, will pay a price in the form of diminished control over
their case-from choice of attorney to settlement. 196 The argument against litigation funding based on the client's diminished control is, in essence, one of separation of ownership and
control between the client and the funder (like the attorney in
contingency cases). This is, however, a conceptual confusion
that is caused by the tendency to treat third-party funding as
identical to attorney funding, in which the party with the purse
strings exerts undue control. But unlike the case of attorney
funding, with litigation funding and claim transfer the client
relinquishes full or partial ownership over its claim. (In fact,
arguably, the attorney and client are now both agents of the
194. See, e.g., WAYE, supra note 7, at 221.
195. For example, Vicki Waye in her book outlines and discusses two models of relationships between funders and claim holders. Id. at 221. Under the
first, management of the proceeding is wholly delegated to the funder, and
under the second, management of the proceedings is maintained by the client.
Id. The categories of problems that may arise in both cases include agency
problems of adverse selection, information asymmetry, and divergent goals.
Id. at 222-26. Each of the three members of the triangular relationship may
have different views on which strategies should be employed in the litigation,
when and for how much to settle, whether the client can withdraw the lawsuit
altogether, and whether the client or funder gets to pick counsel. Id. In the
case of multiple claim holders, there are also fears of collusion between the attorney, defendant, and funder; potential free-rider problems; and possible conflicts of interest between class members. Id. at 221-67.
196. Repeat player clients, who may have an ongoing relationship with
funders, may have more control than one-shotters and modified one-shotters,
at least at the outset of litigation and over choice of attorney.
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funder who co-owns part or the entire claim.) The law should
acknowledge that the client relinquishes or should relinquish
partial control over the litigation as it transfers partial ownership thereof. This, of course, should be factored into the pricing
of the finance in favor of the client.
Even if one were to posit that something less than ownership is transferred, the case has already been powerfully made
that diminished client control is acceptable in attorney-funded
"entrepreneurial lawyering"-where the funder may seek out
potential plaintiffs, take a pecuniary interest in the outcome,
and act as private enforcer of the law. 197 The case is doubly true
for third-party funding which involves a commercial investor's
funding, which is entrepreneurial par excellence.
Beyond concerns relating to control and directly affecting
the funded party's bargaining position, fragmentation creates
conflicts between an attorney's interest to maximize fees and
those of the financier to do the same. These divergent interests
may lead one to settle early but the other to proceed to trial
(depending on the role the case may have in their respective
portfolios of cases and on the short-term interest of the principals). Similarly, if fee splitting is prohibited and the attorney
receives a flat or hourly fee instead of a percentage of the recovery, the attorney has less incentive to properly vet a case as
they transfer all risk to the funder. This moral hazard can increase if claims are then securitized and further distributed.
While both attorneys and funders, as savvy repeat players,
have an interest in creating and preserving reputational gains,
this interest may pull them in different directions in any given
litigation and may not be aligned with the client's interest in,
say, resolving a suit and moving on with her life. 198
Conflicts of interest are not the only complication. Client
communication with the financier-who is likely to insist on
such communications as a means of monitoring its investment-breaks the attorney-client privilege. 199 But a lack of
such communication creates information asymmetries between
the attorney and the funder and lowers the funder's ability to
supervise the attorney's work, supervision which may be bene197. Coffee, supra note 167, at 877 (coining the term "entrepreneurial litigation"); see also Coffee, supra note 56, at 678-80 (discussing opportunism and
entrepreneurial attorneys).
198. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
199.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (describing the attorney-

client privilege).
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ficial for the client. More broadly, the potential to have an
"agents-watching-agents" benefit is significantly reduced. 200
When the financed party is a class or a corporation, or
when the process in question is international arbitration, agency problems between the client, on the one hand, and the funder and attorney, on the other, may pose particular challenges.
In these cases, the Class Action Bar, the Defense Bar, and the
International Arbitration Bar, respectively, are populated by a
finite set of repeat players. 20 1 The funder-attorney relationships
in these instances often may become repeat-play relationships.
Consequently, here too are enhanced conflicts of interests between the client and both of its agents which results in less potential for the agents-watching-agents benefit.
In sum, litigation funding offers the potential of systemic
benefits for litigants and for the civil justice system as a whole.
But it is not a panacea of social justice or economic efficiency.
The fragmentation of the attorney-client-funder relationship,
with its consequent agency problems, diminishes the potential
benefits litigation funding may entail from a bargaining perspective. It is these complications that should be the focus of
regulatory efforts. The same is true of the concerns arising from
the prospect of secondary markets and underlying champerty
that are relevant to the contemporary economic landscape and
to litigation finance under the taxonomy above. Regulators, legislators, the courts, and the parties negotiating funding contracts should take into account the above-described agency
problems in the different categories of litigations to efficiently
manage litigation finance. The next Part offers a conceptual
framework to develop such regulatory measures and contract
devices.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM: REGULATION OF
LITIGATION FINANCE
As we have seen, a hard and fast prohibition is undesirable
and unnecessary. In other areas of the law where similar concerns arise, mechanisms have been developed to ameliorate
200. Developed in the context of institutional shareholders' monitoring corporate managers, the concept of "agents watching agents" involves situations
where the self-interests of one set of agents involves monitoring other agents,
who have a different set of self-interests which, in turn, may conflict with the
interests of the principals. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The
Promise of InstitutionalInvestor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 850 (1992).
201. See discussion supra Part III.B.1-2.
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them and to allow the similar practices. In the case of litigation
funding, the risks involved are overwhelmed by two major benefits. One is the increased access to justice. The other is that
litigation finance helps align the bargaining power of different
categories of litigants and gives previously excluded categories
(e.g., "one-shotters" and modified "one-shotters") a chance to
play for rule change as modified repeat players. 202 That, however, does not mean that litigation finance should be left unchecked. Litigation funding transforms fundamental socioeconomic relationships-among clients, attorneys, and the investing public-in ways that this Article only begins to outline.
More will be learned as the industry matures and expands, as
challenges to it are brought, as courts opine on it, and as more
scholars put their heads together to contemplate this watershed development.
The following reform recommendations, therefore, are not
intended to be an exhaustive list. Rather, they are intended as
a conceptual framework for regulation aimed at maximizing
the benefits and minimizing the difficulties inherent in litigation funding. While the suggested measures can go a long way
towards strengthening the client's legal and bargaining positions vis-A-vis the funder and providing the client with redress
in case a funder breaches its duties, they will not eliminate the
underlying problems. In other words, the funder-client relationship, like the attorney-client relationship, can create a form
of entrepreneurial litigation where the social benefit of allowing
the relationship, with all of its shortcomings, outweighs the
costs.
The elements of the suggested regulatory framework are as
follows: (1) eliminate the champerty prohibition, at least as it
relates to litigation funding; (2) reform the attorney-clientfunder relationship, including by extending some of the protections and duties of the attorney-client relationship to the funder-client relationship, by limiting the prohibition on fee sharing
to allow attorneys to contract directly with the funders, and allowing and encouraging fee structures that align the three parties' interests; (3) apply consumer-protection and contractdesign principles to funding agreements; (4) require court supervision over the attorney-client-funder arrangements; and (5)
tailor securities regulation to legal-claims-backed securities.

202. See supra Part III.B.
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A. ELIMINATING THE CHAMPERTY RESTRICTION AS IT RELATES
TO THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING

We have seen that the policy grounds for the champerty
prohibition include a desire to discourage frivolous litigation,
fear of unfair dealing by Great Men, fear of permitting lay persons to engage in the unauthorized practice of law, fear that
funding arrangements will harm the clients by creating conflicts of interest and will threaten the independence of lawyer's
professional judgment, fear that attorneys or clients could
share confidential information with the third party, and finally
that third parties could effectively control litigation.
Some of these concerns, like the fear of a deluge of nonmeritorious claims are, at the very least, greatly exaggerated. 203
Litigation finance does not eliminate litigation costs; it shifts
them to the funder (and distributes them in a secondary market in legal claims). 204 A commercial funder needs to make a rational economic decision to invest in a claim. It would not do so
if the claim does not have merit and is unlikely to succeed. 205
The immediate conclusion from the analysis in Part III is, similarly, that elimination of the champerty prohibition, at least as
it relates to the litigation-funding context, will increase access
to justice and equal participation in the judicial process. A
modernization of champerty laws can be achieved via legislative means (as in Australia and the United Kingdom) or by
judicial development of the doctrine (as in some states).
B. REFORMING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT-FUNDER RELATIONSHIP

The first and possibly most radical recommendation regarding this relationship is that some of the protections and
duties of the attorney-client relationship be expanded to en203. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55
MD. L. REV. 1093, 1103 (1996); Marc Galanter, Essay, The Turn Against Law:
The Recoil Against ExpandingAccountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 291 (2002).
204. It should also be noted that early settlement, which is likely to be the
outcome in the majority of funded cases, creates a positive externality: "From
the social perspective . .. the savings from settlement are larger than the sum
of the parties' cost savings because society also avoids incurring the court's expenses." Shavell, The FundamentalDivergence, supra note 8, at 602.
205. Baker & McKenzie lawyers report that "as a rule of thumb, claims
must .

.

. have a likelihood of success of at least 65%." BAKER & MCKENZIE

LLP, supra note 10. This is an example, however, of the utility of a taxonomy
because noncommercial funders such as nongovernmental organizations and
governments may have noneconomic incentives to financially back a suit as in
the Clinton case. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684-86 (1997).
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compass funders. Coupled with transparency requirements pertaining to the funder-attorney relationship (discussed below),
this measure will help to minimize conflicts of interest between
both agents and the client, reduce information asymmetries between the attorneys and the funder, and protect the client's
ability to communicate freely with her attorney. Perhaps most
critically, this element can contribute most to strengthening
the client's position vis-A-vis the funder, minimizing the conflicts of interest and moral hazards discussed in Part III and
enhancing client control over the litigation. For example, a fiduciary duty on the part of the funder toward the client can
improve the client's position vis-A-vis the funder's shareholders
where the funder has to navigate potentially competing interests. The funder's fiduciary duties can also increase the client's
bargaining position regarding nonmonetary remedies, diminishing the problem of commodification.
The key protections of the attorney-client relationship are
the confidentiality of attorney-client communicationS 206 and the
protection of attorney work product. 207 If these are extended to
communications with the funder, one of the key impediments to
effective third-party funding will be removed. This may also
lower the cost of financing to clients as funders will have more
information about their investment and, therefore, more certainty as to its value. This extension can be achieved doctrinally, either by extending the common interest doctrine or by
viewing both the client and the funder as co-clients, in the
same manner as these solutions have been devised and applied
in the insurance context. 208
With privilege comes obligation: funders should be deemed
fiduciaries of the client. Fiduciary duties-especially those apSee MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.6 (2010).
207. Id. cmt. 3.
208. "Under the common interest doctrine, the 'sharing of privileged information that otherwise would constitute a waiver does not relinquish the protections of the privilege, so long as the parties maintain the confidentiality of
the shared information.' . . . [Under the co-client model, if] the clients want to
keep their separate communications with their lawyer confidential from one
another, they must expressly so agree." Douglas R. Richmond, The AttorneyClient Privilege and Associated Confidentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron
206.

Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 414-15 (2005) (quoting Lance Cole, Revoking

Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 511
(2003)); see also Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamentals of Lawyers'
Ethics to Insurance Defense Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 60-71 (1997) (describing how similar solutions operate in the insurance context).
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plied to attorneys, namely, the common-law duties of loyalty
and of zeal-should therefore be applied to funders. 209 This
should go a long way towards addressing conflicts of interest
between the funder and the client and enabling a higher measure of client control. For example, once a funder is viewed as a
fiduciary of the client, and must therefore take into account the
best interests of the client, the funder will have to consider
whether nonmonetary remedies better serve the client than do
mere monetary damages. 2 10 Similarly, when considering settlement offers, funders will have to take into account the interests of the client and not only their own interests. 211 Funders
will have to disclose potential conflicts across their portfolio of
investments and will have to seek informed consent for conflicts. 2 1 2 Certain categories of conflicts will be deemed unwaivable just as they are in the attorney-client relationship. 2 13
A closely related recommendation is to allow and encourage fee structures that align the interests of both the funder
and the attorney with those of the client's. For example, hybrid
fees can be devised that include either a reduced hourly rate or
a flat fee for the attorney's services, on the one hand, and a performance bonus or a reduced percentage of the recovery, on the
other. 214 Such an arrangement will incentivize lawyers to invest in the litigation, will reduce the rush to settle and enhance
the attorney's position, as a party with a contingent interest,
vis-A-vis the funder. This, in turn, will help preserve the attor-

209. See generally Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The PeculiarCase of Attorneys' Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909 (2009) (reviewing attorneys'
duties of loyalty and zeal).
210.

Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1-2 (2010)

("[Rule 1.2] confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the
purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by
law and the lawyer's professional obligations."), with DOBBYN, supra note 104,
at 359-60, 366 (describing insurers' general duty to defend even when the
charge does not include an obligation to pay proceeds).
211. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2010) (describing the
duty of zealous representation).
212. Id. R. 1.8.
213. See id. R. 1.7 (2010) (discussing when a lawyer can and cannot
represent a potential client due to conflicts of interest).
214. Coffee suggests that "[t]he conventional wisdom about large contingent fees is that they can motivate the attorney to settle prematurely[,]
... [but if the attorney were paid on a non-contingent basis, the attorney
would have little, if any, incentive to settle early .

. .

. Hence the attorney's

self-interest would counterbalance those of the litigation funder." Coffee, supra
note 7, at 342.
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ney's independent professional judgment and create counterleverage to the funder's bargaining position.
In order for these recommendations to work, attorneys
should be allowed to contract directly with funders. Attorneys
and funders should both be required to fully disclose this arrangement to the client. Reformers can also require that leave
of the court be granted to funders and attorneys wishing to enter into such fee sharing arrangements, as discussed below.
This will require loosening the prohibition on fee splitting in
the litigation finance context or liberalizing the rules on multidisciplinary practices. 215
C. COURT SUPERVISION

Court supervision similar to that required in the class action context should also be considered. 216 In addition to court
supervision of any attorney-funder fee agreement, courts may
also oversee the financing agreement between the funder and
the client. For example, legislators may require that leave of
the court be obtained before entering such an agreement. Court
review may include setting a cap on the proportion of the award
that funders and attorneys (individually and collectively) can
claim, as well as consideration of the incentives set by any feesplitting arrangements. Courts can also scrutinize and approve
the terms of settlements. 2 17
215. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing multidisciplinary practice).
216. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 33 (2000) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
which provides the basis for court supervisory powers over class actions: "Rule
23 builds protective measures directly into its provisions, not only by requiring
the court to certify the class, but also by allowing the court to divide a class
into subclasses where appropriate, to mandate notice to class members, to require opportunities be afforded for directly participating in the action, and to
approve or disapprove any settlement that is reached in a class action.").
217. Judicial review of contingency fees, class actions settlements, and
bankruptcy fees is quite common. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (establishing the
"lodestar standard"), vacated, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976). See generally Macey
& Miller, supra note 164 (analyzing court standards of review for class action
settlements). Bankruptcy law, in particular, grants courts broad supervisory
powers. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 55 (1982) (noting the extensive powers provided by 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
(2006), which provides federal bankruptcy courts the power to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [this title]").
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Courts also may wish to scrutinize, ex ante or when a challenge is raised, the terms of the funder-client and funderattorney contracts as a whole. 2 18 Legislators or courts can develop criteria against which judges can assess whether a funding arrangement is contrary to public policy. Such considerations may include the following: the taxonomy of the client,
process, and area of law in question; whether there is a feesplitting agreement between the funder and attorney and, if so,
what kind of incentive structure it sets up; whether the attorney was chosen by the client or by the funder; the sophistication of the client and whether she was assisted by counsel in
her negotiation of the funding agreement; whether adequate
disclosures were made to the client by the funder and the attorney; whether the client is in a position to make informed decisions regarding the conduct of proceedings; and whether independent advice is reasonably available to the client. 219
D. THE FUNDING CONTRACT: CONTRACT DESIGN AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION

It should be noted that the current prohibition on litigation
funding is a limitation on the freedom of contract. 220 However,
the particular problems posed by the funder-client relationship
affect the public interest in the judicial system and the economy as a whole. Thus, litigation funding contracts should be
subject to the same analysis and protections afforded in other
areas where consumer protection is heightened.
As noted before, the funding contract can be viewed either
as a financing agreement on the plaintiffs side or like an in218. Compare Sternlight, supra note 216, 32-33 (discussing the breadth of
court supervision in class action cases), with STANDING COMM. OF THE
ATTORNEYS-GEN., supra note 109, at 12 (describing the Australian bankruptcy
scheme which gave rise to the entire field of third-party funding: "Currently,
liquidators are obliged to obtain court approval for litigation funding contracts, if the matter may be resolved more than 3 months after the agreement
is entered into. This means that effectively all litigation funding agreements
made by liquidators are vetted by the courts .

. .

. Greater transparency might

also lead to improved competition in the legal services and litigation funding
markets, perhaps resulting in lower pricing.").
219.

STANDING COMM. OF THE ATTORNEYS-GEN., supra note 109, at 11 (dis-

cussing factual scenarios that have come up in Australian jurisprudence).
Australia has seen more than twenty challenges to funding arrangements.
None of the challenged contracts have been struck down, though some cases
were stayed until the funder and the attorney could revise the contracts. Id. at 4.
220. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the current limitations on litigation
financing).
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surance agreement on the defense side. Regulators, legislators,
and the bench are therefore advised to draw on the design and
regulation paradigms of both (retail) finance contracts and insurance contracts when addressing litigation funding. Parties
and the attorneys representing them are also advised to take
into consideration contract design theory when negotiating
such agreements.
1. Contract Design
Given the similarities between the concerns governing insurance agreements and funding agreements, one can adapt
the measures developed in the former context to the latter. Insurance contracts typically include moral hazard clauses aimed
at preventing fraud and collusion against the insurer by allowing the insurer to deny coverage in such circumstances. 221
These include, for example, record-keeping clauses which require insureds to keep records that insurers can later inspect to
evaluate a claim. 222 Similar obligations can be contractually
imposed on litigants seeking funding. This will disincentivize
misrepresentations and better align the interests of the client
and the funder even after the risk transfer has occurred. Similarly, co-payment, co-insurance arrangements, and deductibles
are used as protection against moral hazards ensuring that the
insured has an interest in remaining actively involved in her
defense. 223 Similar risk-sharing arrangements relating to unfavorable awards can be devised as between a funder and a corporate defendant.
In order to deal with conflicts of interest, insurance law also recognizes certain defenses for insurers. The defense of concealment places an affirmative duty on insureds to disclose all
material facts, 224 the defenses of representations and warranties cover express or implied statements made by the insured
221. DOBBYN, supra note 104, at 172.
222. Id.
223. See Molot, supra note 7, at 375 ("[Defendant] could choose to pay the
'expected value' of its lawsuit plus a premium to protect against a higher-thanexpected loss. After making such a payment, the litigant would still retain at
least some of the risk, so as to align incentives and ensure its cooperation
going forward. But the risk of protracted, expensive litigation and of a devastating judgment would no longer be concentrated with the single defendant.").
See generally Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American
CorporateFinance, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing the role of institutional investors in protecting customers from risk).
224. DOBBYN, supra note 104, at 286-87.
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and relied on by the insurer, and limitations and exceptions restrict coverage. 225 Courts can draw on these doctrines by way of
analogy when engaged in contract interpretation of a funding
agreement.
The insurer's corresponding duties include an obligation to
defend any action brought against the insured on any cause of
action that falls within the policy coverage, even when the action may not entail an obligation to pay proceeds. 226 In order to
be able to effectively defend an action, insurance law imposes
on an insured the duty to cooperate with the insurer. 227 This
includes the duty to attend depositions, hearings, and trial, and
to assist in settlement negotiations and in obtaining evidence. 228 All these make the duty easily applicable to the funder-client context where, without such a duty, a moral hazard
may arise in the form of the client having a diminished interest
in participating in the prosecution or defense of her case. Importantly, the insurer's responsibility for the defense also affords it the right to control the litigation, though insurer's generally permit private counsel of the insured to advise and often
employ outside counsel with obligations to the client. 229 The insurer may also negotiate and control settlement. 230
The imposition of some fiduciary duties to ameliorate a
range of concerns suggested above is also familiar to insurance
law. Courts frequently impose on insurers a duty of acting with
reasonable care in performing their obligation to defend. 231
Courts have also devised a bad faith cause of action in insurance contracts aimed at addressing the particular conflicts of
interest inherent in settlement negotiations. 232 Similar to con225. See William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea:Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance,
53 DUKE L.J. 597, 597-601 (2003) (discussing defenses and limitations in the
context of health insurance).
226. DOBBYN, supra note 104, at 359-60, 366.
227. Id. at 317.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 366.
230. See id. at 370.
231. BAKER, supra note 101, at 545-46.
232. California developed the doctrine in the context of conflicts of interest
in relation to settlement negotiations in two seminal cases. Crisci v. Sec. Ins.
Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967) (going so far as suggesting, in dicta, a strict
liability standard whereby an insurer would be held strictly liable for failure
to accept any offer of settlement no matter how strong the defense reasons on
the basis that it is always in the interest of the insured to have the action settled within the policy limits); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 319 P.2d 69, 79

HeinOnline -- 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1333 2010-2011

1334

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1268

flicts in the funding context, an insured may have an interest to
settle for the maximum amount covered by the policy, but an
insurer may have an interest to go to trial and possibly get an
award for a lower sum at the risk of getting an award for a sum
higher than the policy limits. 233
In certain relatively limited circumstances, insurance law
imposes on the insurer a duty to hire independent counsel for
the insured. 234 Some litigation funders are incorporating similar provisions. These provide for an independent counselor to
advise the client regarding settlement offers. 235
2. Consumer Protection: The Insurance Analogy and Finance
Regulation
As noted, insurance regulation and financial regulation are
applicable indirectly and directly, respectively. And both include consumer-protection obligations, which can be incorporated in the regulation of litigation funding. First are capitalization requirements: obligations with regard to the issuer's or
insurer's (and thus a funder's) financial status. 236 These are often coupled with reporting requirements requiring the filing of
annual (and quarterly, in the case of issuers) statements with
regulators. 237 Second are disclosure requirements and informed
consent: duties to disclose to the client the risks and benefits of
the arrangements including fees, commissions, and all other
significant features of the proposed agreements. 238 Disclosure
requirements can also encompass funder's possible conflicts of
interest, funder's financial ability to provide the funding
pledged, the funder's intention to securitize or otherwise sell its
(Cal. Ct. App. 1957). The cause of action is derived from the contracts principle
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but in the insurance context, most jurisdictions consider it a tort. DOBBYN, supra note 104, at 399.
233. Id.
234. San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.
is the leading case on conflicts of interest in the triangular relationship between insurer, insured, and attorney. 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 496 (Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that where the insured and the insurer have conflicting interests the
insurer must pay the reasonable cost for hiring independent counsel by the
insured).
235. Interview with Anonymous, Exec., Undisclosed Inv. Firm (Nov. 2009).
236. STANDING COMM. OF THE ATTORNEYS-GEN., supra note 109, at 8 (describing the imposition of disclosure duties regarding capitalization requirements on Australian litigation funders).
237. BAKER, supranote 101, at 22 (describing state reporting requirements).
238. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2006) (detailing federally mandated disclosure requirements for lending agreements).
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rights in a funded litigation, and any agreement between the
funder and the attorney. Third are standard form requirements, which may include developing and making available
model financing contracts and provisions. 239
Of course, if securitization of legal-claims-backed securities
are developed and sold to the public, the existing protections of
securities law will become applicable. These protections involve
detailed registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements
about the issuing entity and all material characteristics of the
asset pool and selection criteria. 240
The discussion of how best to regulate a secondary market
in legal claims would benefit from the discourse on the reform
of securities regulation in light of the recent financial crisis.
Measures contemplated as part of the current discourse on legal reform of the securities industry and aimed at curtailing
the moral hazard involved in the originate-and-distribute model can be imposed on issuers of legal-claims-backed securities
whether or not they are adopted more widely. 241 Such measures
may include: the reintroduction of tighter standards for due diligence conducted by independent due diligence firms; requiring
issuers, like litigation finance firms, to hold on to an adequate
portion of the subordinated tranche of legal-claims-backed securities (representing the riskiest assets); and denying the ability to hedge risk on the subordinated tranche. 242 The attention
being paid to models of valuation and rating could help defuse
the tension between the disclosure requirements imposed by
securities regulation and the confidentiality requirements in
international arbitration, and the difficulty in valuing and,
therefore, of rating such securities.
Furthermore, the attorneys involved in the triangular attorney-client-funder relationship at any rate must conduct due

239. BAKER, supra note 101, at 38-39 (describing the use of standard form
agreements in insurance law); see also Larry CatA Backer, From Moral Obligation to InternationalLaw: Disclosure Systems, Markets, and the Regulation
of Multinational Corporations,39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 591, 630 (2008) ("Regimes of
financial reporting and disclosure are basic to the regulatory regimes of virtually every state.").
240. See Regulation AB, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1100 et seq. (2010) (framing the
regulatory scheme governing asset-backed securities); Rule 144, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144 (promulgated under section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933); see also
VINOD KOTHARI, SECURITIZATION: THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT OF THE
FUTURE 854-76 (2006).
241. See Hearing,supra note 185, at 53-54.
242. See generally id. at 51-67 (discussing the desirability of such reforms).
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diligence of the legal claims. 2 4 3 Since their role is already understood to diverge from the pure attorney-as-advocate role,
one can contemplate structuring that role so as to utilize the
attorneys as gatekeepers. 244 They would monitor the financier
in its capacity as issuer and dissuade it from reckless practices. 245
CONCLUSION
Reflecting back on the examples in the opening of this
Article, we can now see how moving from prohibition of litigation funding to its regulation can be beneficial both to litigating
parties and to society as a whole. It enables reaping the benefits of enhanced access to justice and private enforcement of the
law while minimizing the concerning side effects of allowing a
third party to fund litigation. The first example illustrated the
notion that individual plaintiffs with (potentially) meritorious
claims that they nonetheless cannot afford to prosecute may
use third-party support to go up against even the most powerful of defendants-the President of the United States. It also
illustrated the need for regulatory mechanisms, such as court
supervision of funded litigations, to prevent abuse and subversion of the court system for political ends.
The next example envisioned villagers suffering environmental harms and human rights abuses by a multinational
corporation based in the United States. Physically remote,
poor, and living within a compromised legal system, the Angolan villagers would have little chance of vindicating their rights
against the corporation that injured them. With litigation funding, however, the villagers and other plaintiffs like them would
not only gain access to U.S. courts, but would be able to litigate
without having to settle at a discount. In the process, they
would promote not only private enforcement of environmental
and human rights standards, but also engage in rule change in
areas where the funder may have a similar, or even greater, incentive than the plaintiffs to play for rules. Regulations impos-

243. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 192-93 (2006).
244. Id.
245. See id. at 192 (2006) (arguing that at the wake of the corporate scan-

dals of the early 2000s that corporate attorneys can and should serve as "gatekeepers," not only as advocates, to assist in preventing corporate fraud); Molot,
supra note 7, at 376 (advocating that the attorney in the litigation-finance context be viewed as a broker of litigation-finance services).
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ing, among other things, a form of fiduciary duty on the funder
toward the plaintiffs would limit the chances that the latter's
interests were steamrolled.
The third example involved a corporation purchasing afterthe-event insurance against a major class action allowing it to
continue its operations, raise capital, and engage in major
transactions while the litigation is ongoing. Under the suggested regime, a primary market for such insurance will be
available and secondary markets might even lower the price of
such insurance. The moral hazard that this type of insurance
may create will be minimized through the devices detailed in
Part IV and also due to the fact that the company will be operating in a landscape in which its opposing parties may now be
more formidable given their own access to funding.
Next, the reader was invited to imagine an oil company
funding a developing country's defense of a boundary dispute.
Without such funding, the sovereign might find itself unable to
mount a sophisticated defense of a serious, albeit peaceful,
threat to its physical integrity. The concerns-among them, a
potential conflict of interest between an oil company concerned
with securing its fields and a country concerned with the much
larger issues of it borders-conjured up by such a scenario can
be addressed through the reporting and licensing requirements
and disclosure rules. These all will help shed light on such a relationship allowing for public scrutiny. Similarly, a regulated,
transparent, and competitive litigation-finance industry would
provide the sovereign in question with alternative funding
sources. The sovereign would now be able to comparison shop
for the best available financing terms, both in terms of strings
attached and in terms of price. The developing nation would
still gain access to sophisticated counsel and reap the rewards
of rule change, in the form of boundary delineation, without
having to cede control to an entity that is not a party to the litigation, but that may have an interest in its subject matter.
The final example invoked the specter of China's Sovereign
Wealth Fund gleaning, as a litigation funder, proprietary information retained by an American company regarding sensitive technologies. Applying a nuanced analysis based on the
taxonomy would allow us to determine that a narrowly defined,
subject-matter-specific prohibition relating to national security
may be an appropriate response that does not hamper the ability to retain litigation finance for matters that are not of national security concern. Alternatively, funding may be permitted
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with restrictions on abuse of the discovery process, currently
imposed on attorneys, extended to the funders of the attorneyclient-funder relationship.
All of this is not to idealize litigation finance. The elaborate
regulatory regime envisioned in Part IV, the cautionary note to
parties and their attorneys regarding the need for careful contract design, and the analogies to the heavily regulated insurance and finance industries are meant to acknowledge the
complexities involved in moving away from a prohibition responsibly. However, the aim of this Article is to suggest that litigation finance is an industry whose time has come. Thirdparty financing of litigation will increase access to justice and
encourage private enforcement of the law. It will eliminate a
market failure plaguing corporate America: the inability of corporations to efficiently manage the risk of litigation. Most important, however, litigation funding will reduce systemic inequalities in our legal system by altering the bargaining
positions of individual, class, and sovereign plaintiffs and corporate defendants in a way that will increase the equality of
arms in any given litigation and make it more likely that more
kinds of litigants will be able to play for rules. This is the coveted change at the level of parties that scholars of litigation
equality have long advocated. Unlike other suggested largescale reforms, it is politically viable because it benefits both
plaintiffs and defendants. So, whose claim is this anyway? With
careful management, any meritorious claim irrespective of the
social position of the party in question.
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